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It is easy to eavesdrop:
Every time an American calls in sick to work, or sits on hold with
the phone company, or phones a coconspirator to discuss a criminal
plot, he or she occupies one of the 379,597,000 phone lines in the
United States, which amount to more than five for every four people.'
Nearly 178 million of these are landlines, and, as they travel through
the two billion miles of cable crisscrossing the country, almost all are
transferred at digital switches.4 At the behest of a government
agency, the switching computer can make an undetectable digital
copy of any conversation it processes The other 201 million plus are
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I INT'L TELECOMM. UNION, COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY STATISTICS, at A-5 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/atglance/basicO5.pdf [hereinafter TELECOMM.
STATISTICS]. Statistics in this textual paragraph refer to information gathered in 2005.
2 Id. at A-9, available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at-glance/manO5.pdf.
3 Dan Bart, Private Sector Co-Chair, Am. Nat'l Standards Inst. Homeland Sec. Standards
Panel, Address at the Defense Standardization Program Conference (Mar. 17, 2004) (slides
available at http://www.dsp.dla.mil/2004-DSP-conf/Bart-031704.ppt).
4 Seejoginder S. Dhillon & Robert I. Smith, Defensive Information Operations and Domestic Law:
Limitations on Government Investigative Techniques, 50 A.F. L. REV. 135, 137 n.5 (2001) ("The tele-
communications system itself no longer uses operators to manually plug in calls to a
switchboard but depends on computerized switching stations to handle the billions of calls
placed each day." (quoting Cybercrime, Transnational Crime and Intellectual Property Theft: Hearing
Before theJ. Economic Comm., 105th Cong. 146 (1998) (statement of Michael A. Vatis, Deputy As-
sistant Director and Chief, National Infrastructure Protection Center, Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation))).
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2004 WIRETAP REPORT 5 (2004),
http://www.askcalea.net/reports/docs/2004wiretap.pdf (discussing generally the government's
use of electronic surveillance); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE 29-61 (1995) (discussing generally the "technical aspects of
electronic surveillance").
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cellular phone lines,6 on which conversations can be intercepted by
IMSI catchers, so named because they pose as legitimate base stations
to log the line's International Mobile Standard Identifier and tap and
record its audio feed.7 The advent of the digital age and the coopera-
tion of telecommunications companies have made more detectable
spy-movie techniques like direct-line tapping or radio bugging un-
necessary, although law-enforcement and government agencies can
and do use them as well." Conversations intended to pass directly be-
tween the mouths and ears of private individuals traverse miles of
government-regulated copper wire and airwaves and pass through lo-
cations easily accessed by eavesdroppers.
Wiretaps are not only easy to use, but also valuable. Over the past
few decades, federal, state, and local authorities in the United States
have used wiretaps to bust drug-trafficking rings,9 uncover corruption
6 TELECOMM. STATISTICS, supra note 1, at A-29, available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/
statistics/atglance/cellular05.pdf; see also David Alan Jordan, Decrypting the Fourth Amendment:
Warrantless NSA Surveillance and the Enhanced Expectation of Privacy Provided by Encrypted Voice over
Internet Protocol, 47 B.C. L. REv. 505, 535, 544 (2006) (discussing the particular surveillance con-
cerns with an additional voice-transmission technology, Voice over Internet Protocol, or VolP,
and arguing for enhanced regulatory protection in light of them).
See Roger Boyes, Berlin Revives Spy Story, TIMES (London), Oct. 23, 1999, at 16 (describing
the use of IMSI catchers).
' See Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the Non-
adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REv. 923, 948 (1996) ("Unbeknownst to the de-
fendant, the co-defendant agreed to work for the government and allowed government agents
to install a radio transmitter in his car." (citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 202-03
(1964))); Surveillance and Individual Privacy, 20 U.N. CHRON. 25, 26 (Apr. 1983) ("Long before
the Second World War, phones were tapped by means of direct cuts into telephone wires and
spliced into a set of earphones, which permitted eavesdroppers to overhear both sides of tele-
phone conversations."); see also Louis Lavelle, Private Eye Pleads Guilty to Illegal Wiretap: A Court Is
Told Bankers Insurance Did Not Know a Regulator's Telephone Was Tapped, TAMPA TRIB., June 25,
1996, Florida/Metro, at 1 ("According to court documents, Rayner's wiretap-a short-range
radio transmitter with a nine-volt battery and antenna wire-was discovered in August 1995 by
telephone company employees on the junction box on McCarty's lawn."); Jon Van, Eavesdrop-
ping Getting Easier, CHI. TRiB., Feb. 7, 1994, Business, at 1 ("For $20 or $30, Ross said, one can
buy a radio transmitter/microphone smaller than a cigarette lighter from any consumer elec-
tronics store. 'You can toss one into a potted plant in someone's office and hear everything that
goes on there,' Ross said."); THE CONVERSATION (Paramount Pictures 1974) (depicting the real-
istic use of listening devices and the paranoia that accompanies them). But see Bruce Berkowitz,
Terrorists' Talk: Why All That Chatter Doesn't Tell Us Much, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, § 4, at 5
("Today, a direct tap is often impossible. Digital messages, via cellphone or Internet, can follow
any number of paths from Point A to Point B."); Mark Brown, Trying to Uncover FBI Bugs? It's
Not Hard to Beat the Clock, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 11, 2004, at 2 (describing various countermea-
sures for confronting radio bugging devices).
See, e.g., Richard Boyd, Narcotics Chief Named Investigator Supervisor, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans, La.), Sept. 26, 1999, at 14H2 (recounting how a sheriffs captain used wiretapping to
bring down a drug kingpin and his trafficking ring); Carrie Johnson, Prosecutor Wins Ruling in
Wiretap Dispute, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Dec. 19, 2002, Citrus Times, at 1 (reporting a
judge's ruling on the admissibility of evidence gathered from a wiretap on the phone of an al-
leged drug trafficker); see also Nathan Odgaard, Omaha Crack Dealer Sentenced to Prison, OMAHA
WORLD HERALD, May 26, 2001, at 15 (noting that a convicted crack dealer's arrest was based on
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among federal officers,' ° build evidence in bank-fraud cases," track
down fugitives, root out espionage, and bring down organized
crime families.'4  Wiretaps have also helped expose terrorist plots. 5
This track record has given rise to what Jack Balkin and Sanford Lev-
inson call the National Surveillance State.' 6 It is unsettling to wonder
whether one's own phone conversations might have had uninvited
listeners. Yet, if their interference with the private conversations of
innocent individuals is minimized, and if they appropriately target
those who harm society, wiretaps by law enforcement officers are so
effective and vital that the risk of misuse is acceptable.
information received from a wiretap); Suspect Pleads Guilty to Being a Drug Courier, BUFFALO
NEWS, Dec. 1, 1998, at 7B (relating that an alleged drug mule was arrested based on informa-
tion from federal wiretaps).
10 See, e.g., Matt O'Connor, US Charges 2 at Midway: Federal Officers Are Accused of Aiding Drug
Ring, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20, 2004, at C3 (detailing how wiretapping was used to connect federal
officers to drug traffickers).
1 See, e.g., Court Rules Wiretaps Lawful, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 13, 2002, at A22 (reporting
the admissibility of wiretap evidence against members of the anti-government group Montana
Freemen in a trial for bank fraud).
12 See, e.g., John Spano, Ex-Real Estate Broker Guilty in Chatsworth, Newhall Land Swindle, L.A.
TIMES, May 25, 1988, Metro pt. 2, at 8 (mentioning that wiretaps of the phones of a fugitive's
relatives helped bring him in).
13 See, e.g., Brooke A. Masters, Jury Rejects Entrapment Defense, Convicts D.C. Couple of Spying,
WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1998, at A8 (noting that three years' worth of tapes from FBI wiretaps
helped convict former campus radicals of spying for East Germany).
14 See, e.g., Ralph Blumenthal, How Tapes and a Turncoat Helped Win the War Against Gotti, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992, § 1, pt. 1, at 30 (explaining the role FBI wiretaps played in prosecuting
mob bossJohn Gotti); see also Faye Bowers, Case May Clarify Rules for Using Informants, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Boston), June 30, 1997, at 3 (mentioning the wiretapping of a mafia induction
ceremony, which led to five arrests).
15 SeeJames Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16. 2005, at Al ("[E]avesdropping... had helped to uncover a plot.. . to bring down the
Brooklyn Bridge with blowtorches.... [A]nother... plot, involving fertilizer bomb attacks on
British pubs and train stations, was exposed.. . ."). However, "most people targeted for NSA
monitoring have not been charged with a crime, including an Iranian-American doctor in the
South who came under suspicion because of what one official described as dubious ties to
Osama bin Laden." Id. DanielJ. Solove argues that surveillance can have a significant indirect
effect on crime: "The Panopticon achieves obedience and discipline by having all prisoners
believe they could be watched at any moment. Their fear of being watched inhibits transgres-
sion. Surveillance can thus prevent crime by making people decide not to engage in it at all."
Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1264, 1267
(2004).
16 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan
Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at
43), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=930514. Balkin and Levinson argue that geopolitical
developments, in particular the War on Terror, and technological innovation have combined to
create "a significant increase in ... government bureaucracies devoted to promoting domestic
security and ... gathering intelligence and surveillance using all of the devices that the digital
revolution allows." Id. at 43-47.
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Because of the perpetual tension between civil liberties and the
need for security,' society demands that safeguards be built with
acumen and balanced with precision, diminishing misuse while pre-
serving wiretaps' usefulness. The procedures and regulations ensur-
ing balance are outlined in statutes including Title III of the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,' the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,19 numerous state statutes, 20 and,
perhaps most famously, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
21
17 Compare Remarks in a Discussion in Canton, Ohio, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2533
(Oct. 22, 2004) ("Talking about education and health care, these are very important issues. But
let me say to you that it all goes to naught if we don't secure this country, that the security of the
American people is the most important responsibility of the President."), and A FEW GOOD MEN
(Sony Pictures 1992) ("Son, we live in a world that has walls, and those walls have to be guarded
by men with guns.... [Y]ou need me on that wall.... [You cannot sleep] under the blanket of
the very freedom that I provide, then question[] the manner in which I provide it."), with
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (Warren, C.J.) ("Implicit in the term 'national
defense' is the notion of defending those values and ideals which set this Nation apart.... It
would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of
one of those liberties.., which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile."), and Assembly
(Pa. 1755) (statement of Benjamin Franklin), reprinted in 6 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
442 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1963) ("Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a
little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.").
18 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), amended by USA PATRIOT Improvement
and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ l10(b) (3) (C), 113, 506(a) (6), 120
Stat. 192, 208, 209, 248 (2006) and Violence Against Women and Department of justice Reau-
thorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 1171(b), 119 Star. 2960, 3123 (2006).
19 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000).
20 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 42.20.300-.390 (2004) (addressing when it is permissible to
transmit private conversations and engage in eavesdropping); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-15-101 to
-104 (2005) (defining the appropriate situations for courts to grant ex parte orders regarding
the interception of wire, oral and electronic communications); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-41a to
-41u (2005) (listing the requirements and procedures for wiretapping and electronic surveil-
lance); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, §§ 2401-2434 (2005) (outlining lawful and unlawful surveil-
lance procedures); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-60 to -69 (2004) (describing the guidelines con-
cerning wiretapping, electronic surveillance and the interception of communication); MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 10-401 to -414 (LexisNexis 2005) (establishing the lawful pro-
cedure for intercepting communication and disclosing it); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 542.400-424
(2005) (addressing permissible wiretapping and the necessary procedural requirements); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 570-A:1-: 11 (2005) (detailing the lawful mechanisms for wiretapping, eaves-
dropping, and disclosure); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A156A-1 to -34 (2005) (establishing the wire-
tapping and electronic guidelines for the state); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-29.2-01 to -05 (2005)
(listing the procedural requirements for wiretapping in drug offense investigations); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2933.51-.66 (LexisNexis 2006) (explaining the procedural and disclosure re-
quirements for interception of wire, oral or electronic communications); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 5701-5782 (2000) (articulating the wiretapping and electronic surveillance guidelines);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-301 to -311 (2002) (detailing the order requirements for electronic
surveillance); W. VA. CODE §§ 62-ID-1 to -16 (2005) (establishing wiretapping and electronic
surveillance guidelines).
2 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1871 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), amended by USA PATRIOT Act Addi-
tional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-178, §§ 3-4, 120 Stat. 278, 278-
81 and USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177,
§§ 105-106, 108-109, 128, 506, 120 Stat. 192, 195-200, 203-05, 228-29, 247-48 (2006).
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In addition to statutory provisions, the Constitution itself affords
some protection: generally, surveillance via wiretap constitutes
"search and seizure," thus triggering Fourth Amendment rights.2 2 If,
in .communicating over the telephone under particular circum-
stances, a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, law-
enforcement officers generally cannot use electronic surveillance to
eavesdrop without a warrant that meets Fourth Amendment re-.23
quirements.
In December 2005, uproar broke out over news that President
George W. Bush had secretly authorized the National Security Agency
(NSA) to wiretap, without warrants, the international e-mails and tele-
phone calls of people inside the United States.24 Lawmakers called
for an inquiry into wrongdoing and demanded an explanation.25
Arlen Specter, a five-term senator representing President Bush's own
Republican Party, called such warrantless wiretapping "wrong," add-
ing, "[I]t can't be condoned at all. ' 26 Amid the scandal the day the
story broke, the Senate temporarily blocked renewal of the USA
PATRIOT Act,2 7 a law that was not directly related to the wiretapping
in question but, in its post-9/11 expansion of law enforcement pow-
ers, had come to symbolize a similar tension between security and
civil liberties.2  The American Civil Liberties Union, Al-Haramain Is-
22 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment governs
not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral state-
ments... ."); cf U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause... and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
23 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1967) (declaring a New York wiretapping stat-
ute unconstitutional because it did not meet the probable cause and particularity requirements
of the Fourth Amendment). But see United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450, 1455 (9th Cir.
1991) (noting that since-enacted statutory requirements go beyond the constitutional require-
ments outlined in Berger).
24 Dan Eggen, Bush Authorized Domestic Spying: Post-9/11 Order Bypassed Special Court, WASH.
POST, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al; Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 15.
25 Maura Reynolds & Greg Miller, Spying Scandal Draws Heat: Lawmakers Call on Bush to Ex-
plain His Post-9/11 Order Allowing a Secret Agency to Monitor US. Citizens Without First Getting a War-
rant, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2005, atA8.
26 Id.
27 See Richard B. Schmitt, Senate Blocks the Renewal of Patriot Act: The Rebuff to Bush Comes Amid
News that He Authorized Wiretaps of Americans without Court Clearance; Fate of Post-9/11 Law Is Un-
clear, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2005, at Al (discussing prospects for renewal of Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter USA PATRIOT Act]).
28 Compare Bob Barr, USA PATRIOT Act and Progeny Threaten the Very Foundation of Freedom, 2
GEO.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 385, 385-86 (2004) ("[T] he Act, and the progeny of other policies, regu-
lations, programs, and acts it has spawned, threatens not just to weaken, but eviscerate fully, the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."), with Viet D. Dinh, How the USA
Patriot Act Defends Democracy, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 393, 399 (2004) ("During these times,
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lamic Foundation, and Center for Constitutional Rights filed suits in
federal court to block the activities.29 The ACLUsuit led to an injunc-
tion against the program, stayed pending appeal.30 The Senate enter-
tained a resolution to censure the President over his role in authoriz-
ing the program. 1 President Bush was defiant in the face of criticism,
addressing the nation in an unusually pointed radio broadcast with
the argument that his actions were "consistent with U.S. law and the
Constitution" and that it was the leak of information about the pro-
gram that was "improper[]," resulting in "our enemies learn[ing] in-
formation they should not have." 2 Indeed, the administration fought
when the foundation of liberty is under attack, it is critical that we both reaffirm the ideals of
our constitutional democracy and also discern the techniques necessary to secure those ideals
against the threat of terrorism."). See generally Richard Henry Seamon & William Dylan Gard-
ner, The Patriot Act and the Wall Between Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 319 (2005) (discussing the USA PATRIOT Act's blurring of the distinction between
law-enforcement and foreign-intelligence-surveillance functions); Douglas J. Sylvester & Sharon
Lohr, Counting on Confidentiality: Legal and Statistical Approaches to Federal Privacy Law After the
USA PATRIOT Act, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 1033 (discussing the levels of confidentiality and trust re-
quired for legislation from the perspective of law and statistics); Symposium, The Future of Inter-
net Surveillance Law: A Symposium to Discuss Internet Surveillance, Privacy & the USA PATRIOT Act,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1139 (2004) (discussing various aspects of surveillance and privacy under
the USA PATRIOT Act regime).
Complaint, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-CV-00313 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17,
2006), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/govt-misconduct/docs/
NSAcomplaintFINAL1 1706.pdf; Complaint, AI-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, No. 06-274-KI,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64102 (D. Or. Sept. 7, 2006); Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Re-
lief, ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006), available at
httl ://www.aclu.org/images/nsaspying/assetupload file137-23491.pdf.
ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (mem.). Judge Anna Diggs Taylor
found that the government-asserted state-secrets privilege did not apply, id. at 765, that plaintiff
U.S. persons who conduct calls overseas for legitimate reasons had standing to sue, id. at 771,
that the program "obviously" violated the Fourth Amendment, id. at 775, that violation of the
First Amendment followed, id. at 776, that the program violated separation-of-powers princi-
ples, id. at 778, that it violated FISA, id. at 778-79, that the AUMF did not override FISA, id. at
780, and that neither any inherent executive power nor practical concerns justified the pro-
gram, id. at 780-82. Judge Taylor's opinion in the case has come under scrutiny by legal schol-
ars. See Posting of Laurence Tribe to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com (Aug. 19, 2006,
15:10 EDT) ("[The opinion] seems almost to have been written more to poke a finger in the
President's eye than to please the legal commentariat or even, alas, to impress an appellate
panel, although I certainly agree with the many who predict that, while her reasoning is bound
not to be embraced, her bottom line is very likely to survive appellate review."); Posting of
Eugene Volokh to Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com (Aug. 17, 2006, 19:15 PDT) ("[Judge
Taylor's] opinion ... seems not just ill-reasoned, but rhetorically ill-conceived. A careful,
thoughtful, detailed, studiously calm and impartial-seeming opinion might have swung some
higher court judges .... A seemingly angry, almost partisan-sounding opinion.., is unlikely to
sway the other judges.").
The Al-Haramain case has survived a state-secrets-privilege challenge. Al-Haramain Islamic
Found. v. Bush, No. 06-274-KI, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64102 (D. Or. Sept. 7, 2006).
31 152 CONG. REC. S1987, 2011-16 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2006).
92 Rick Schmitt & Mary Curtius, Bush Defends Eavesdropping as Defense Against Terrorism: He
Vows to Continue the Newly Acknowledged Domestic Program Despite Mounting Criticism, Even from
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back by opening up an investigation into the source of the leak.33 At-
torney General Alberto Gonzales maintained that "winning the war
on terror requires winning the war of information.
3 4
The revelations brought political America to an emotional boiling
point, but nearly lost in the ruckus was careful discussion of whether
the wiretaps were unconstitutional, illegal, neither, or both. This
Comment will address these issues through the lens of constitutional
law in light of the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Hamdan v. Rums-
35feld. Part I will investigate the known factual details of the war-
rantless-wiretapping program. Part II will explore the threshold
question of whether wiretapping is within the scope of the executive's
Article II authority and conclude that, broadly speaking, it is. Part III
will lay out the arguments whether, despite the President having the
constitutional power to wiretap, that power is nonetheless necessarily
forestalled in this case because it runs afoul of the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of the surveilled. With constitutional issues set aside, Part
IV will apply statutory law to the program and find it illegal and, di-
rectly contradicting administration contentions, lacking statutory au-
thority under either the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or the
Authorization for Use of Military Force against terrorists to override
its general illegality. Part V will return to the Article II analysis to
controvert the assertion that the President's constitutional authority
supersedes the statutory prohibition. The Comment will conclude by
addressing the intelligence options with which the government is left
in the absence of the NSA eavesdropping program.
I. PRESIDENT BUSH'S WARRANTLESS WIRETAPPING PROGRAM
In March 2002, Pakistani police and U.S. agents raided homes in
Faisalabad, Pakistan, in an effort to arrest suspects linked to a church
bombing in Islamabad that month.36 One of those captured was sub-
sequently discovered to be Abu Zubaydah, a high-ranking member of
the terrorist group al-Qaeda who is believed to have participated in
Within His Own Party, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at Al (quoting The President's Radio Address,
41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1880, 1881 (Dec. 17, 2005)).
33 Dan Eggen, Justice Dept. Investigating Leak of NSA Wiretapping: Probe Seeks Source of Classified
Data, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2005, at Al; see also Posting of Brian Ross & Richard Esposito to The
Blotter, http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/ (May 15, 2006, 10:33 EDT) (reporting that a
federal intelligence agency was tracking the phone records of ABC News reporters as part of an
investigation into leaks).
Dan Eggen & Charles Lane, On Hill, Anger and Calls for Hearings Greet News of Stateside Sur-
veillance, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2005, at Al.
" 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Commissioners Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
36 Brian MacQuarrie & Absar Alam, Fighting Terror: Pakistan Crackdown Police Raids; US Said to
Aid in Roundup of Bomb Suspects, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 29, 2002, at A13.
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planning the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Penta-
gon as well as failed attempts to bomb embassies and, on New Year's
Eve 1999-2000, hotels.3 7  His capture turned out to be one of the
most important in the months following 9/11: he divulged vital in-
formation about the 9/11 plot after interrogation,s and his computer
and personal phone directory gave U.S. law-enforcement officials
names, phone numbers, and addresses that were potential leads for
catching other terrorists.s
To take advantage of those leads without delay, President Bush is-
sued a classified executive order authorizing the NSA to wiretap the
phone lines and e-mail addresses gathered in the arrests of Abu
Zubaydah and others. 4° Indeed, the President had already authorized
such NSA activities in October of 2001, before the passage of the USA
PATRIOT Act.41 Intelligence gathered from this monitoring of com-
munications between al-Qaeda operatives led to more phone num-
37 See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 174 (2004) ("On November 30, 1999, Jordanian
intelligence intercepted a telephone call between Abu Zubaydah, a longtime ally of Bin Ladin,
and Khadr Abu Hoshar, a Palestinian extremist. Abu Zubaydah said, 'The time for training is
over.'" (citing Judith Miller, Holy Warriors: Dissecting a Terror Plot from Boston to Amman, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2001, at Al)); Romesh Ratnesar, reported by Jason Tedjasukmana et al., Confes-
sions of an al-Qaeda Terrorist; American Interrogators Finally Got to Omar al-Faruq, Who Detailed Plans
to Launch a New Terror Spree in Southeast Asia, TIME, Sept. 23, 2002, at 37 (discussing Zubaydah's
alleged involvement in embassy-bombing plots); Philip Smucker, How Bin Laden Outsmarted
America's Military Might in the Caves of Tora Bora, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 11, 2002, at 9
("Pakistani border troops and FBI officials picked up Abu Zubaydah, a senior al-Qa'eda military
planner, who is suspected of direct involvement in planning the September 11 attacks.... .").
Contra Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's "Extraordinary Rendition"
Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106 (casting doubt on Zubaydah's connection to the
embassy-bombing plot).
38 See, e.g., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 37, at 466 n.18 (noting that cited in-
formation was gathered from Abu Zubaydah during interrogation of Oct. 29, 2002); id. at 470
n.76 (interrogation of unspecified date in 2003); id. at 491 n.31 (interrogation of Aug. 29,
2002); id. at 491 n.35 (interrogation of May 16, 2003); id. at 500 n.5 (interrogation of July 10,
2002); id. at 500 n.8 (interrogation ofJune 24, 2003); id. at 507 n.125 (interrogation of Dec. 13,
2003); id. at 524 n.90 (interrogation of Feb. 19, 2004); id. at 527 n.108 (interrogation of Feb. 18,
2004). But see Douglas Jehl & Eric Lichtblau, Shift on Suspect is Linked to Role of Qaeda Figures,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2005, at Al (reporting that the United States reduced the charges against
alleged dirty-bomber Jose Padilla because allowing the defense to confront Zubaydah in court
would divulge classified, and perhaps abusive, interrogation techniques).
39 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 15; see also David E. Kaplan et a]., Playing Offense: The Inside
Story of How US. Terrorist Hunters Are Going After al Qaeda, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 2,
2003, at 18 ("The Pakistanis also recovered a trove of materials in Zubaydah's safe house-CDs,
address books, financial records, a satellite phone .... 'Zubaydah's capture felt like a turning
point.' By the end of spring 2002, more than 100 CIA officers and FBI agents had poured into
Pakistan...
40 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 15.
41 Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General, to Senator Arlen Specter, Chair-
man, Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/nation/nationalsecurity/gonazles.letter.pdf [sic] [hereinafter Gonzales Letter].
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bers and more e-mail addresses, which, once surveilled, themselves
spiraled into more leads. 2 According to President Bush, "the pro-
gram was limited to monitoring phone conversations or e-mails of
someone inside the United States and someone beyond its borders in
which 'one of the numbers would be reasonably suspected to be an Al
Qaeda link or affiliate.'
43
Most of the numbers and addresses gathered were overseas, but
hundreds if not thousands were inside the United States.44 This
meant that the NSA was venturing into new territory. The NSA, a
Fort Meade, Maryland-based intelligence agency believed to be the
largest in the country,45 has as its mission the gathering and analysis
of foreign intelligence.46 The agency had a history of collecting intel-
ligence abroad and emphasizing its protection of domestic privacy.
In an April 2004 address before the Senate, then-NSA head General
Michael V. Hayden called the NSA "the most aggressive agency in the
intelligence community when it comes to protecting U.S. privacy";
the agency's website once featured a presentation proclaiming "Court
Order Required in the United States. '47 Under this new program, the
agency began collecting data from, not only communications taking
place wholly outside the country, but also those between someone
overseas and someone located in the United States, though it ab-
stained from purposefully surveilling entirely domestic calls and mes-
sages. 4s NSA shift supervisors made case-by-case decisions to intercept
42 Id.
43 James Gerstenzang, In Long Address, Bush Defends Spying Program: He Calls It and the Patriot
Act Needed and Legal Tools to Fight Terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, at Al1; accord Alberto R.
Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General, & Gen. Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Dir. for Nat'l Intel-
ligence, Press Briefing at the James S. Brady Briefing Room (Dec. 19, 2005) (transcript
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051219-1.html) (de-
scribing the target of the surveillance as situations where there is "a reasonable basis to con-
clude that one party to the communication is a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or
a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda" (statement of Attorney General Gonza-
les)).
44 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 15.
45 Maura Reynolds, Gonzales Defends Spying as 'Limited and Lawful,'L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2006, at
Al1.
46 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 15.
'7 Scott Shane, At Security Agency, News of Surveillance Program Gives Reassurances a Hollow Ring,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at A22.
48 The President's News Conference, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1885, 1889 (Dec. 19,
2005) ("[T]hese calls are not intercepted within the country. They are from outside the coun-
try to in the country or vice versa."); cf Eric Lichtblau, Bush Defends Spy Program and Denies Mis-
leading the Public, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2006, at All ("[President Bush] said several times that the
eavesdropping was 'limited to calls from outside the United States to calls within the United
States."); Lisa Rein, Bush Defends Spying Program as Necessary to Protect U.S.: But President Acknowl-
edges Civil Liberties Concerns, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2006, at A2 ("The White House clarified that
the program monitors incoming and outgoing calls."). Contra James Risen & Eric Lichtblau,
Spying Program Snared U.S. Calls, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2005, at Al ("[The] surveillance pro-
gram.., has captured what are purely domestic communications in some cases, despite a re-
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communications.4 9 This on-the-spot decision-making was undertaken
"like the police officer on the beat in terms of what is reasonable. 5 °
There is an ordinary channel for authorization of this kind of sur-
veillance: the warrant-application process in the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, which, established under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), meets secretly at the Department of Justice. 5
Typically, it had been the Federal Bureau of Investigation, not the
NSA, that applied for such warrants for electronic surveillance within
the United States.2 According to the administration, the reason for
using the NSA and circumventing the FISA court was the increased
need for swift information-collection in the wake of major terrorist
attacks. 3
The Justice Department and NSA reviewed the program every
forty-five days, and the President personally signed off on its reau-
thorization over thirty times.54 After the program commenced, the
administration repeatedly briefed a handful of congressional leaders
on it, though the level of detail given to legislators remains un-
quirement by the White House that one end of the intercepted conversations take place on for-
eign soil ... ."); see Josh Meyer & Joseph Menn, US. Spying Is Much Wider, Some Suspect, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, at Al (reporting that some U.S. officials and experts in intelligence hy-
pothesize that the NSA spying program may be a much broader, "look-at-everything type pro-
gram"); cf. Gonzales Letter, supra note 41 ("The Department believes that the interception of
the contents of domestic communications would present a different question from the inter-
ception of international communications, and the Department would need to analyze that
question in light of all current circumstances before any such interception would be author-
ized.").
49 See Gonzales & Hayden, supra note 43 ("The judgment is made by the operational work
force at the National Security Agency using the information available to them at the
time,... and it's a two-person standard that must be signed off by a shift supervisor .... "
(statement of Gen. Hayden)); cf Wartime Executive Power and the NSA 's Surveillance Authority:
Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. (2006) (transcript available at 2006 WL
270364) [hereinafter Senate Judiciary Surveillance Hearing] (statement of Attorney General Al-
berto R. Gonzales) ("The decision as to which communications will be surveilled are made by
intelligence experts out at NSA.").
Senate Judiciary Surveillance Hearing, supra note 49 (statement of Attorney General Gonza-
les).
51 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 15. For an explanation of these procedures, see infra Con-
clusion.
52 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 15.
53 Id.
Schmitt & Curtius, supra note 32; accord The President's Radio Address, supra note 32.
Attorney General Gonzales maintained that this oversight was effective:
NSA's Office of the General Council has informed us that the oversight process con-
ducted both by that office and by the NSA Inspector General has uncovered no abuses of
the Terrorist Surveillance Program, and, accordingly, that no disciplinary action has
been needed or taken because of abuses of the Program.
Gonzales Letter, supra note 41.
55 See Senate Judiciay Surveillance Hearing, supra note 49 (statement of Attorney General Gon-
zales) ("[W]e have advised bipartisan leadership of the Congress and the Intel Committees
about this program."); The President's Radio Address, supra note 32 ("Leaders in Congress
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clear.5 6 The Senate Intelligence Committee's ranking Democrat, Jay
Rockefeller, claimed that "the administration never afforded mem-
bers briefed on the program an opportunity to either approve or dis-
approve" the program, and wrote in a concerned 2003 letter to the
White House that, "[g]iven the security restrictions associated with
this information, and my inability to consult staff or counsel on my
own, I feel unable to fully evaluate, much less endorse, these activi-
ties. '57 The administration countered with the assertion that, though
the number of members of Congress informed was kept low for secu-
rity reasons, the program had sufficient congressional oversight.58 To
accord with the law requiring the President to keep the congressional
intelligence committees "fully and currently informed
of ... intelligence activities,, 59 the administration briefed the "Gang
of Eight": the Speaker and minority leader of the House, the major-
ity and minority leaders of the Senate, and the chairs and ranking
minority members of the House and Senate Intelligence Commit-
tees.60  Senator Specter argued that informing only eight members
have been briefed more than a dozen times on this authorization and the activities conducted
under it.").
56 See Greg Miller & Maura Reynolds, US. Spying Plan Lacked Congress' Scrutiny, Leading De-
mocrat Says: Sen. Rockefeller Accuses the Bush Administration of Misleading the Public in Saying that
Lawmakers Were Kept Informed on the Wiretap Program, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at A32 (noting




59 50 U.S.C. § 413(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
60 John Diamond, Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Never Easy: Secret Nature Has Restricted
Briefings with Little Recourse, USA TODAY (McLean, Va.), Dec. 21, 2005, at 8A. The article dis-
cusses both the general workings of Gang of Eight briefings and some details of the briefings on
the NSA program:
That meeting in September 2004 is when [Representative Pete] Hoekstra first
learned [of the warrantless surveillance]. Hoekstra was not allowed to take notes or at-
tend with a staff member. At the end, he was asked if he had any questions.
"It was, 'Speak now or forever hold your peace,"' Hoekstra said.
Id. Under the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 413-13b (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), the
President is required to keep the House and Senate intelligence committees "fully and cur-
rently informed" of intelligence activities, including "significant anticipated... activit[ies]." In
amending the Act to require the reporting of anticipated activities in addition to current activi-
ties, Congress noted that the change "means, in practice, that the committees should be advised
of important new program initiatives and specific activities that have major foreign policy impli-
cations." S. REP. No. 102-85, at 32 (1991). Reporting to the Gang of Eight is a procedure out-
lined in section 413b(c) (2) governing the reporting of covert actions:
If the President determines that it is essential to limit access to the finding to meet ex-
traordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States, the finding may
be reported to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional intelli-
gence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, the
majority and minority leaders of the Senate, and such other member or members of the
congressional leadership as may be included by the President.
50 U.S.C. § 413b(c) (2) (2000 & Supp. TV 2004). However, that provision is limited to "the re-
porting of covert actions" where the President finds "extraordinary circumstances affecting vital
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was improper for a program of this magnitude: "You can't have the
administration and a select number of members alter the law.... It
can't be done.,
61
According to senior government officials cited in the New York
Times, when the program began, it had "few controls" and "little for-
mal oversight."62  The NSA could target individuals it suspected of
having ties to terrorists without the approval of the Attorney General
or President. 63 In mid 2004, in response to growing concerns about
the fate of the program in the event of the election of presidential
candidate John Kerry and to complaints from Judge Colleen Kollar-
Kotelly,64 the Justice Department audited the wiretapping program
and provided a checklist for NSA officials to determine whether there
was probable cause in a given case.6" Still, the program continued
without direct executive oversight.
66
interests of the United States." Id. § 413b (emphasis added). "Covert action" is defined as "an
activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or mili-
tary conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will
not be apparent or acknowledged publicly," and the definition expressly excludes "activities the
primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence[] [or] traditional counterintelligence activi-
ties." Id. § 413b(e). Since the warrantless wiretapping program is excluded by this definition, it
falls under the category of "all intelligence activities[] other than a covert action," making its
reporting to the intelligence committees as a whole required by section 413a. See Memorandum
from Alfred Cumming, Specialist in Intelligence & Nat'l Sec. Foreign Affairs, Def. &
Trade Div., for the Cong. Research Serv. 6-8 (Jan. 18, 2006), available at http://www.gwvu.edu/
-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB178/surv38.pdf (analyzing the statutory reporting procedures for
intelligence programs as applied to the reporting of the warrantless wiretapping program).
61 Miller & Reynolds, supra note 56.
62 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 15.
63 Id.
64 Judge Kollar-Kotelly sits on the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and, since
2002, has been presiding judge over the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. Id.
Id.; see also Carol D. Leonnig, Secret Court'sJudges Were Warned About NSA Spy Data: Program
May Have Lead Improperly to Warrants, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2006, at Al ("James A.
Baker... discovered.., that the government's failure to share information about its spying
program had rendered useless a federal screening system that the judges had insisted upon to
shield the court from tainted information. He alerted Kollar-Kotelly,... prompting a tempo-
rary suspension of the NSA spying program... ."). Though the Department ofJustice devised a
tagging system to prevent the use of information gathered in the controversial program for ob-
taining FISA Court orders, "the NSA was not providing [Baker] with a complete and updated
list of the people it had monitored, so Justice could not definitively know-and could not alert
the court-if it was seeking FISA warrants for people already spied on .... " Id. Judge Kollar-
Kotelly and her predecessor, Judge Royce C. Lamberth, expressed their concern that the pro-
gram was unconstitutional, though they did not believe themselves to be in a position to address
the issue. Id.
Another possible factor in the decision to reevaluate the program was the March 2004 re-
fusal of then-Acting Attorney General James B. Comey to sign off on its renewal, prompting
Andrew Card, President Bush's chief of staff, and Alberto Gonzales, then-White House counsel,
to visit then-Attorney General John Ashcroft in the hospital and implore him to approve the
program. Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Justice Deputy Resisted Parts of Spy Program, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2006, § 1, at 1. Even Ashcroft was reportedly wary of certifying the program at that meet-
ing "in light of concerns among some senior government officials about whether the proper
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A second wave of controversy erupted nearly five months after the
initial New York Times disclosure: In May, USA Today reported that, in
addition to wiretapping international calls, the NSA was collecting
the phone-number and call-time data from billions of domestic tele-
phone calls. 67 Major telecommunications companies were cooperat-
ing to provide the agency with data to form a massive database, con-
structed with an eye toward detection of terrorist activity in a social-
network analysis of call patterns." The newly revealed program dif-
fered from the warrantless wiretapping program in the purely domes-
tic nature of its targeted calls and in its abstention from capturing the
contents of phone conversations, focusing instead on its metadata."9
Not surprisingly, the President and other government officials de-
nied existence of the wiretapping program until it was made public.
When in 2005 Senator Barbara Mikulski asked Attorney General Gon-
zales and FBI Director Robert Mueller whether "the National Security
Agency, the great electronic snooper, [can] spy on the American
people," Gonzales responded, "There are limits upon the NSA in
terms of what they can do in spying upon the American people," and
Mueller added, "The investigation or development of intelligence
overseas is in the hands of the CIA and NSA. And generally, I would
say generally, they are not allowed to spy or to gather information on
American citizens," pointing to exceptions in those cases where a70
court granted warrants. In a 2004 speech discussing the importance
and scope of the USA PATRIOT Act, President Bush assured his au-
dience that domestic wiretaps require warrants:
[T]here are such things as roving wiretaps. Now, by the way, any time
you hear the United States Government talking about wiretap, it re-
quires-a wiretap requires a court order. Nothing has changed, by the
way. When we're talking about chasing down terrorists, we're talking
about getting a court order before we do so. It's important for our fellow
citizens to understand, when you think PATRIOT Act, constitutional
oversight was in place at the security agency and whether the president had the legal and consti-
tutional authority to conduct such an operation." Id.
66 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 15.
67 Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans' Phone Calls: 3 Telecoms Help Govern-
ment Collect Billions of Domestic Records, USA TODAY (MacLean, Va.), May 11, 2006, at IA.
68 Id.
69 Id. These differences are substantial enough to consider the domestic data-mining a dif-
ferent type of surveillance program, one that this Comment will not directly address. For rough
sketches of the distinct legal issues involved in the data-mining program, see Posting of Kate
Martin, Director, Center for National Security Studies, to ACSBIog, http://www.acsblog.org/
(May 11, 2006, 16:26 EDT); OrinKerr.com, http://www.orinkerr.com/ (May 11, 2006, 12:11
EDT). For further exploration of the details of the program, see Seymour M. Hersh, Listening
In, NEW YORKER, May 29, 2006, at 24; Mark Hosenball et al., Hold the Phone, NEWSWEEK, May 22,
2006, at 22.
70 Hearing on the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 Before S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong.
(Apr. 27, 2005).
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guarantees are in place when it comes to doing what is necessary to pro-
tect our homeland, because we value the Constitution.7'
After the revelations broke, however, the administration was candid
about its involvement in, if not the details of, the wiretapping pro-
72
gram.
II. THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE AS
GROUNDED IN ARTICLE II
A threshold question in determining the validity of the NSA pro-
gram authorized by the President is whether the Executive has the
power to authorize surveillance programs at all. Absent such power,
questions of individual rights and statutory law become moot. A sur-
vey of case law determines that the Executive has a constitutionally
granted power to wiretap.
Article II of the Constitution anoints the President commander in
chief of the nation's military7 3 and grants him or her powers to con-. • 74
duct various aspects of foreign affairs. These powers in relation to
foreign affairs are broader than the specific examples outlined in Ar-
ticle II, and courts have recognized the necessity of executive domin-
ion in such areas. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the
Supreme Court observed that,
[i]n this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate
and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or
listen as a representative of the nation.... As Marshall said in his great
argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, "The Presi-
dent is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations."
75
71 Remarks in a Discussion on the PATRIOT Act in Buffalo, New York, 40 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 638, 641 (Apr. 20, 2004).
72 See, e.g., Schmitt & Curtius, supra note 32 (outlining the administration's justification for
its actions).
73 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the ac-
tual Service of the United States .. ").
74 See, e.g., id. at cl. 2 ("He shall have Power... to make Treaties; . .. and he shall nominate,
and.., shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States.... .").
75 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). The defendants in Curtiss-Wright were charged with providing
machine guns to Bolivia in violation of a joint resolution making it illegal to sell weapons to
countries engaged in South America's Chaco War, a 1930s skirmish over a disputed desert be-
tween Bolivia and Paraguay. Id. at 311-12. According to the terms of the resolution, the prohi-
bition would only take effect if the President proclaimed that it would be beneficial to peace.
Id. at 312. The defendants demurred, urging that Congress could not delegate such a policy
decision to the President. Id. at 314. The Court, in an opinion by Justice George Sutherland,
found the delegation proper because of the President's broad foreign affairs authority. Id. at
319.
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The Court also linked the commander-in-chief and foreign-affairs
powers when reasoning about the relationship between congressional
acts and presidential orders. 6 Likewise, Justice Thurgood Marshall
called it "beyond cavil that the President has broad powers by virtue
of his primary responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs and
his position as Commander in Chief.",
7
1
In wartime, these executive powers may be interpreted with par-
ticular breadth. In Hirabayashi v. United States, the Court faced the
question whether Congress and the Executive collectively had the
power to impose a wartime curfew on "all persons of Japanese ances-
try."78 The Court found that both the President and Congress should
be given wide latitude in time of war:
[s]ince the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress the
exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of warfare,
it has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise ofjudgment and
discretion in determining the nature and extent of the threatened injury
or danger and in the selection of the means for resisting it.
7 9
The Supreme Court noted the breadth of the President's wartime
commander-in-chief and foreign-affairs powers during both World
War II 8° and the present wars on terrorism and in Iraq and Afghani-
stan."
76 See, e.g., Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948) ("The
President also possesses in his own right certain powers conferred by the Constitution on him as
Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ in foreign affairs."). In Chicago & Southern,
both Chicago & Southern Air Lines and Waterman Steamship applied to the Civil Aeronautics
Board for certificates to engage in foreign and overseas air transportation pursuant to the Civil
Aeronautics Act. Id. at 104-05. Waterman brought suit when the Board denied its application
and granted Chicago & Southern's. Id. The Court found that where, as in the area of overseas
and foreign air transportation, the application requires presidential approval, the decision is
political and therefore in the dominion of the executive and not the judiciary. Id. at 106, 111.
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 741 (1971) (Marshall,J., concurring). The
United States had brought suit against the New York Times and Washington Post for publishing the
classified report "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." Id. at 714. The
Court found that the United States had not overcome the heavy presumption against imposing
a prior restraint. Id. Justice Marshall wrote separately to pose the question whether the Court
had jurisdiction to protect information classified as "secret" or "top secret" by the executive. Id.
at 741.
18 320 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1943).
79 Id. at 93. But see Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (apologiz-
ing and making reparations "on behalf of the people of the United States [for] the evacuation,
relocation, and internment of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese
ancestry during World War II").
80 See, e.g., Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93 ("[Tlhe Constitution... has necessarily given [the Ex-
ecutive] wide scope... ."); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1942) ("[The President] has un-
dertaken to exercise the authority conferred upon him by Congress, and also such authority as
the Constitution itself gives the Commander in Chief, to direct the performance of those func-
tions which may constitutionally be performed by the military arm of the nation in time of
war."). In Quirin, the German-born (and, with one disputed exception, German-citizen) peti-
tioners had landed in 1942 on the U.S. East Coast in German submarines wearing German mili-
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These powers include the power to electronically surveil foreign
and international communications. In United States v. Butenko, two
defendants, charged with transmitting sensitive information concern-
ing the Strategic Air Command to the Soviet Union, challenged theS • 82
U.S. government's electronic surveillance of their communications.
In ruling that "a warrant prior to search is not an absolute prerequi-
site in the foreign intelligence field when the President has author-
ized surveillance, '"8 3 the Third Circuit grounded the surveillance
power in the broadly defined commander-in-chief and foreign-affairs
powers of Article II:
As Commander-in-Chief, the President must guard the country from for-
eign aggression, sabotage, and espionage. Obligated to conduct this na-
tion's foreign affairs, he must be aware of the posture of foreign nations
toward the United States, the intelligence activities of foreign countries
aimed at uncovering American secrets, and the policy positions of for-
eign states on a broad range of international issues.
This sentiment was echoed in United States v. Truong Dinh Hung.s5
There, the defendants had been convicted of espionage for transmit-
ting "diplomatic cables and other classified papers" to representatives
of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam at the 1977 Paris peace talks.8 6
To find Truong's source for the papers, the FBI, without seeking a
warrant, tapped his phone line and bugged his apartment. 7  The
Fourth Circuit ruled that the Executive did not need a warrant from
the judiciary to conduct foreign-intelligence surveillance:
[T]he executive branch not only has superior expertise in the area of
foreign intelligence, it is also constitutionally designated as the pre-
eminent authority in foreign affairs. The President and his deputies are
charged by the constitution with the conduct of the foreign policy of the
United States in times of war and peace. Just as the separation of pow-
ers ... force[s] the executive to recognize ajudicial role when the Presi-
dent conducts domestic security surveillance, so the separation of powers
requires us to acknowledge the principal responsibility of the President
tary uniforms and bearing explosives. Id. at 20-21. After they were apprehended, the President
appointed a special military commission to try them. Id. at 22-23. The petitioners applied for
leave to file for habeas corpus, alleging that the President lacked authority to appoint the mili-
tary commission. Id. at 24. The Court found that the President was acting under authority
granted by Article II and by Congress's Articles of War. Id. at 28.
81 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("[The] Consti-
tution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking belong in the hands of those who are
best positioned and most politically accountable for making them."). For a discussion of Hamdi,
see infra Part IV.B.
82 494 F.2d 593, 596-97 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc).
83 Id. at 605-06.
84 Id. at 608.
85 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
86 Id. at 911.
87 Id. at 912.
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for foreign affairs and concomitantly for foreign intelligence surveil-
lance .8
The President's power to conduct foreign-intelligence surveillance, so
grounded in the Constitution, predated the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act.88 Though that statute purported to regulate this power
and proscribe its use in certain instances,90 it did not destroy it.
The additional Article II basis for the presidential power to eaves-
drop is rooted in the Section 1 Oath of Office Clause, which recog-
nizes the duty of the President to "Rreserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States." The Supreme Court has read
into this duty
the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or
overthrow it by unlawful means. In the discharge of this duty, the Presi-
dent-through the Attorney General-may find it necessary to employ
electronic surveillance to obtain intelligence information on the plans of
92
those who plot unlawful acts against the Government.
The Oath of Office Clause thus provides grounds over and above
those in the commander-in-chief and foreign-affairs powers. Hence,
the Executive has an Article II power to engage in foreign intelli-
gence surveillance.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF THE SURVEILLED
In mid Febuary, 1965, a man named Charles Katz frequently vis-
ited telephone booths on the Sunset Strip in Los Angeles. He would
insert a dime, dial Miami or Boston, and say things into the receiver
like "Give me Duquesne minus 7 for a nickel."9  Charles Katz was
transmitting gambling information across state lines, and he knew it
was a crime, but he didn't know that the FBI was listening.9 5 After
microphones secretly wired to the top of the booths picked up Katz's
incriminating end of the conversation, FBI agents visited Katz's
88 Id. at 914 (internal citations omitted). But see Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (en banc plurality opinion) (holding unconstitutional the attorney general's surveillance
of a domestic organization without a court-ordered warrant, even where the President ordered
it in the name of national security). For a discussion of the facts of Zweibon, see infra Part III.
89 Both Butenko and Truong concerned surveillance that took place before the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, took effect.
90 For an analysis of whether the President retains power to conduct wiretapping outside of
the scope of FISA regulation, see infra Part V.
91 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
92 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972). For a discussion of the
facts of Keith, see infra Part III.
95 See Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 131-32 (9th Cir. 1966) (describing the circum-
stances surrounding Katz's surveillance and arrest for insterstate transmission of gambling in-
formation), rev'd, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
94 Id. at 132.
95 Id. at 131.
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apartment and arrested him. Though he was convicted at trial, Katz
continued to argue that the recording of his conversation violated his
Fourth Amendment rights.97
While the President's Article II powers facilitate the endeavor for
national security, the Fourth Amendment balances them with a pro-
tection of privacy rights.9 As noted earlier, a wiretap constitutes a
"search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 99
In general, this means a warrant is a necessary prerequisite to elec-
tronic surveillance by law enforcement.' °° There may, however, be an
exception to the warrant requirement in cases involving national se-
curity and foreign intelligence.'0 ' The NSA program may fall into
96 Id.
97 Id. at 133.
98 Though many of the individual freedoms protected in the Bill of Rights were responses to
what the Framers saw as historical government oppression of the colonies, the Fourth Amend-
ment warrant requirement is particularly rooted in British abuses:
The British general warrant was a search tool employed without limitation on location,
and without any necessity to precisely describe the object or person sought. British au-
thorities were simply given license to "break into any shop or place suspected" wherever
they chose .... General warrants executed during the reign of Charles I sought to in-
timidate dissidents, authors, and printers of seditious material by ransacking homes and
seizing personal papers ....
In the colonies, complaints that royal officials were violating the privacy of colonists
through the use of writs of assistance, equivalent to general warrants, grew. Because Eng-
lish law did not, as yet, recognize a right of personal privacy, the crown's abuses in the
colonies were not remediable at law.
William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U.
L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2000) (citations omitted).
99 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("[T]he Fourth
Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording
of oral statements .... ").
100 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 50 (1967) (declaring a New York eavesdropping stat-
ute unconstitutional because it did not meet the probable-cause and particularity requirements
of the Fourth Amendment). The Berger petitioner was convicted as a go-between for principal
conspirators in a scheme to bribe a liquor licensing official based on evidence gathered
through electronic surveillance pursuant to a New York permissive statute. Id. at 43-45. But see
United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that the constitutional
requirements outlined in Berger are ordinarily outshined by since-enacted statutory require-
ments). In Koyomejian, a case concerning the surveillance of defendants believed to be involved
in drug-related money laundering, the Ninth Circuit faced the question of whether domestic
video surveillance was permissible for criminal prosecution purposes. Id. at 1452.
101 Another possible exception exists. The "border search" exception, discussed in United
States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977), and noted in United States v. Montoya deHernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 538 (1985), allows for the warrantless searching of all international postal mail. Such
an exception may apply to electronic communications which cross the "border" of the country
as well. Posting of Orin Kerr to Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com (Dec. 19, 2005, 16:02
PST). However, there is little legal support for this argument beyond the speculative. In Zwei-
bon v. Mitchell, the D.C. Circuit noted that the justification for the border search exception ap-
plies in only very limited circumstances:
[T] here are several crucial considerations which possibly justify the special treatment for
border searches and which differentiate such searches from normal searches governed
by the Fourth Amendment or the national security searches involved in this case. First
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such an exception if one exists, but there remain strong arguments
that it is counter to the Fourth Amendment, throwing its constitu-
tionality into question.
When first applying the Fourth Amendment to surveillance cases,
the Court left open a national-security exception. In Katz v. United
States, the Court applied the standards of the Fourth Amendment
°0 2
and reasoned that constitutional constraints required the agents to
apply for and acquire a warrant from ajudicial body to assure that the
spying was appropriately limited to ensure Charles Katz's privacy,
which they had failed to do.0 3 Nevertheless, the Court left open the
question whether requirements would apply in a case involving the
interests of national security.' 4 Justice Byron White, in a concurring
opinion, postulated an exception for cases involving such interests:
" [w] e should not require the warrant procedure and the magistrate's
judgment if the President of the United States or his chief legal offi-
cer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of na-
tional security and authorized electronic surveillance as reason-
able.' 0 5
The Court later held that warrants are required for domestic spy-
ing even when national security is implicated, 06 but still left open the
and most important is the fact that a border search is conducted incident to conferral of
the privilege of admittance to the country, and it is certain that the subject of the search
is in fact receiving that benefit. In effect, a reasonable border search is "consented" to in
order to obtain a benefit that is only to be accorded those who can show that they should
gain admittance and who can demonstrate that they are only transporting goods which
can lawfully be brought into the country. Moreover, there is little danger of abuse of
such searches. The whole class of those entering the country is treated fairly homogene-
ously, inspections take place at identifiable places, over-intrusive searches will be appar-
ent to their subjects and may thus be challenged in court, and there is a minimal inva-
sion of privacy since there is an expectation on the part of those entering that they and
their possessions will in all probability be searched to at least some extent. Finally, unlike
the national security searches involved in our case, there is no substantial likelihood that
border searches will chill the exercise of First Amendment rights.
516 F.2d 594, 631 n.93 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc plurality opinion) (internal citations omitted).
102 389 U.S. at 351-52.
103 Id. at 354-57. The Court stressed that the issue should be framed in terms of the person
who is the subject of the surveillance, not the location of it:
The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a "constitutionally protected
area." The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not. But this effort
to decide whether or not a given "area," viewed in the abstract, is "constitutionally pro-
tected" deflects attention from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitution-
ally protected.
Id. at 351-52 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
104 Id. at 358 n.23.
105 Id. at 364 (White,J., concurring).
106 A court would likely be even more reluctant to find a general national-security exception
to the warrant requirement today than it would have been in the early seventies; after all, FISA
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possibility of an exception for the surveillance of foreign intelligence.
In United States v. United States District Court-known as Keith after the
name of the district court judge against whom the United States
sought mandamus-Judge Keith had ordered the United States to
disclose to one of the initial defendants conversations it had wire-
tapped.' ° 7 The defendants in question were allegedly members of a
domestic organization that planned the dynamite bombing of a Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency building in Ann Arbor, Michigan, prompting
the Court to note, "There is no evidence of any involvement, directly
or indirectly, of a foreign power."'' 8 The Court limited the question
to whether the President had "power, acting through the Attorney
General, to authorize electronic surveillance in internal security mat-
ters without prior judicial approval."' °9 They answered no:
Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic
security surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion of
the Executive Branch. The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate
the executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested magis-
trates. Their duty and responsibility are to enforce the laws, to investi-
gate, and to prosecute. But those charged with this investigative and
prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize consti-
tutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks."'
Still, the Court left open the prospect of warrantless foreign intelli-
gence surveillance in the interest of national security, maintaining
that "the instant case requires no judgment on the scope of the
President's surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign
powers, within or without this country.""
Though the Supreme Court never resolved this open issue, a few
circuit courts weighed in, holding that warrantless foreign-
intelligence surveillance for national security interests may be permis-
sible under the Fourth Amendment. Jn Butenko, for example, the
Third Circuit held that the facts fell into the foreign-intelligence gray
area left unresolved in Keith and refused to find surveillance contrary
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement:
While we acknowledge that requiring prior approval of electronic surveil-
lance in cases like the present one might have some salutary effects-a
judge, for example, could assure that the Executive was not using the
cloak of foreign intelligence information gathering to engage in indis-
criminate surveillance of domestic political organizations--on balance,
was inspired in part "by Nixon's abuse of surveillance powers under the guise of national security."
Solove, supra note 15, at 1277 (emphasis added).
107 407 U.S. 297, 301 (1972).
Im Id. at 299, 308-09, 309 n.8.
109 Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
110 Id. at 316-17 (internal citations omitted).
I Id. at 308.
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the better course is to rely, at least in the first instance, on the good faith
of the Executive and the sanctions for illegal surveillances incident to
post-search criminal or civil litigation.... In the present case ... a strong
public interest exists: the efficient operation of the Executive's foreign
policy-making apparatus depends on a continuous flow of information.
A court should be wary of interfering with this flow.1"
The court also found the Amendment's "probable cause" standard
met wherever the surveillance is limited and undertaken "'solely for
the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information."
1 3
The Fourth Circuit followed a similar line of reasoning in UnitedS114
States v. TruongDinh Hung. It held that in foreign-intelligence cases
the balance between "individual privacy" and "government needs"
shifts:
IT]he needs of the executive are so compelling in the area of foreign in-
telligence, unlike the area of domestic security, that a uniform warrant
requirement would, following Keith, "unduly frustrate" the President in
carrying out his foreign affairs responsibilities.... A warrant requirement
would add a procedural hurdle that would reduce the flexibility of execu-
tive foreign intelligence initiatives, in some cases delay executive re-
sponse to foreign intelligence threats, and increase the chance of leaks
regarding sensitive executive operations.115
The court reasoned that, because of the complexity of foreign affairs,
the political branches were much better suited to weigh this balance
than the judiciary.1 1 6 In doing so, Truong laid out the most compel-
ling case for the foreign-intelligence exception to the warrant re-
quirement. The Supreme Court had already rejected the argument
that the Fourth Amendment could not infringe on a constitutionally
granted "ownership" of foreign affairs national security issues by the
President: "[W]e think [the President's role] must be exercised in a
manner compatible with the Fourth Amendment."'1 7 Rather than
contradicting the Supreme Court by asserting that the power was the
Executive's alone, the Fourth Circuit relied on the inexperience of
"district courts.., to judge the importance of particular information
to the security of the United States .. ,,"8 This distinction in reason-
ing is important, because the prevailing analysis permits Congress to
regulate the balance, as it did with FISA. Truong specifically ex-
112 United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc) (internal citations
omitted).
11 Id. at 606. But see In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002)
(permitting surveillance where foreign-intelligence gathering was not the "sole" but "a signifi-
cant" purpose).
11 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
115 Id. at 913.
116 Id. at 913-14.
"7 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972).
18 Truong, 629 F.2d at 914.
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empted the FISA Court judges from its conclusion that judges lacked
expertise in foreign affairs 9 and impliedly approved of FISA as a
constitutional balance.
12 0
In Zweibon v. Mitchell, members of the Jewish Defense League
brought suit against the Attorney General and certain FBI agents al-
leging that their wiretapping violated both Title III and the Fourth
Amendment. 12' The D.C. Circuit, calling the Fourth Amendment "a
bulwark against unreasonable governmental intrusion,"'122 held that
a warrant must be obtained before a wiretap is installed on a domestic
organization that is neither the agent of nor acting in collaboration with
a foreign power, even if the surveillance is installed under presidential
directive in the name of foreign intelligence gathering for protection of
the national security.13
The court, despite issuing a holding so narrowly focused on the facts
before it, further expressed "serious doubts as to the methodology
employed" by courts who found an exception to the warrant re-.124
quirement. Although there are strong war-powers concerns in na-
tional-security cases, so too are First Amendment rights more likely to
be implicated in cases where the government believes itself to be pro-
tecting national security. 2 5  National security could conceivably be
19 Id. at 914 n.3 ("The statute will encourage the development of foreign intelligence exper-
tise among these seven judges by empowering them to hear all foreign intelligence warrant re-
quests.").
12 See id. at 914 n.4 (distinguishing a maximum warrant requirement from the appropriate
balancing of individual rights and foreign-intelligence realities in FISA, which went into effect
between the events underlying Truong and the decision itself).
121 516 F.2d 594, 605-06 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc plurality opinion).
122 Id. at 633.
123 Id. at 614.
24 Id. at 613.
125 See id. at 633-34 ("Though the investigative duty of the executive may be stronger in [na-
tional security] cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected
speech.... History abundantly documents the tendency of Government-however benevolent
and benign its motives-to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its policies."
(quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313-14 (1972))). The court
believed that even domestic political discussion could colorably fall under "foreign intelligence"
and "national security" headings:
For example, even the quantity of domestic wheat production could be said to relate to
foreign assistance to underdeveloped countries or to trade with such powers as the Soviet
Union.... The tendency has been to give the term "national security" an overly broad
definition, and the whole point of Fourth Amendment protection in this area is to avoid
such Executive abuses through prior judicial review. Moreover, the exception advocated
by the Government and accepted by some courts is not limited to "national security"
wiretapping in its traditional sense, but extends to any information which "affects" for-
eign affairs or which may be of use in formulating foreign policy decisions. Indeed, if
the asserted Executive exception is based on the President's plenary powers in the field
of foreign affairs, it is difficult to see how any principled approach could distinguish his
power to wiretap without a warrant... on the basis of the importance of the information
as it relates to foreign affairs.
Id. at 636 n.108 (internal citations omitted).
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jeopardized by airing information acquired via surveillance in open
court. But courts could, without unduly frustrating national-security
interests, make in camera inquiries after the fact into the propriety of
foreign-intelligence surveillance before determining whether it im-
properly produced evidence for a criminal trial, 2 6 so national security
should not stand in the way of such inquiries before the fact. 27 Al-
though the Constitution and the practices of the various branches
demonstrate that the President has undeniable foreign-affairs author-
ity, they "do not preordain the procedures with which the President
must comply in exercising that authority.' 28  And although courts
might be better equipped to inquire into domestic-affairs matters
than those involving foreign intelligence, "federal judges will [not] be
insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in foreign
security cases,' 2 9 and Congress has authorized the judiciary to exam-
ine foreign affairs without deferring entirely to the expertise of the




"If the threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement
officers to convey its significance to a court, one may question
whether there is probable cause for surveillance.'
31
Even assuming a foreign-intelligence exception to the Fourth
Amendment exists to some degree, it remains unclear whether it
would apply to President Bush's surveillance program. Most circuits,
presented with the opportunity, have recognized a foreign-
intelligence exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. 2 The Zweibon court, however, refused to do so, and the
Butenko court carefully undertook a Fourth Amendment analysis even
while identifying such an exception, allowing the surveillance only
where it had post-hoc judicial approval, because "there would seem to
126 Id. at 606 n.14 (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 182 (1969)).
127 See id. at 638 n.113 ("[W]e see no reason why in camera inspection is any more opportune
during post hoc review than it would be in a warrant proceeding.").
128 Id. at 616.
1 Id. at 641-42 (quotations omitted). But cf Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("This detention falls squarely within the Federal Government's war
powers, and we lack the expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision.").
130 Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 642-43.
1 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972); cf United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Security is like lib-
erty in that many are the crimes committed in its name."); Charles W. Yost, Op-Ed, Security Cloak
Has a Way of Deceiving the Deceiver, BALT. SUN, Nov. 3, 1973, Opinion, at 17 ("In my thirty-five
years in foreign affairs... the public disclosure of political measures or plans could [almost
never] be truthfully said to jeopardize national security .... [O]nce [politicians] slip into the
national security psychosis, they easily begin to equate ... the nation's security with their own
political power.. ").
132 See, e.g., United States v. Truong Ding Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Buck, 548 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974) (en
banc); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
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be nothing in the language of the Constitution to justify completely
removing the Fourth Amendment's requirements in the foreign af-
fairs field and, concurrently, imposing those requirements in all
other situations." 3 The Butenko and Zweibon courts probably would
have found a Fourth Amendment violation had their facts been simi-
lar to the NSA program at issue, where there were no post-hoc war-
rants. In consideration of the open question of a foreign-
intelligence-surveillance exception, it is difficult to say which prece-
dent is controlling.
In Keith, the Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment inquiry
in electronic-surveillance cases boils down to two questions: "whether
the needs of citizens for privacy and free expression may not be bet-
ter protected by requiring a warrant before such surveillance is un-
dertaken[, and] whether a warrant requirement would unduly frus-
trate the efforts of Government to protect itself from acts of
subversion and overthrow directed against it."' 5 Perhaps, in light of
the emergency-surveillance provisions of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act discussed infra, a court would find the warrant re-
quirement not unduly burdensome for national security; perhaps
public-policy concerns suggest that a Solomonic rule like Butenko's is
the most prudent for balancing national security against civil liber-
ties. If that were the case, it would be unlikely that the NSA activities
would pass muster. Still, a court could go either way on the constitu-
tionality of the President's program.
133 Butenko, 494 F.2d at 603. The court explicitly agreed that the Fourth Amendment war-
rant requirement did apply to some degree:
[T]he Fourth Amendment is also applicable where, as here, the President is acting pur-
suant to his foreign affairs duties even though the object of the surveillance is not a do-
mestic political organization. Our differences with [the dissenting opinion arguing for
an ordinary application of the warrant requirement] center on the necessity for priorju-
dicial authorization under the circumstances of this case.
Id.
1 See S. REP. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 15 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3916
("[A]fter almost 50 years of case law dealing with the subject of warrantless electronic surveil-
lance, and despite the practice of warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance sanctioned and
engaged in by nine administrations, constitutional limits on the President's powers to order
such surveillances remains [sic] an open question."). Though the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act sought to address those limits statutorily, the Constitution's words on the issue have
remained unchanged since.
135 Keith, 407 U.S. at 315.
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IV. VIOLATION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
In the middle of the 1972 presidential election, five men were ar-
rested in an elaborate plot to bug the headquarters of the Democ-
ratic National Committee at the Watergate in Washington. One of
the five men, James W. McCord Jr., was a security coordinator for
President Nixon's Committee for the Re-election of the President,'
3 7
and another, Bernard L. Barker, received in his bank account a
twenty-five-thousand-dollar cashier's check made out to Kenneth H.
Dahlberg and intended as a contribution to the Nixon campaign. 13
The FBI eventually discovered that the break-in was just part of "a
massive campaign of political spying and sabotage conducted on be-
half of President Nixon's reelection and directed by officials of the
White House and the Committee for the Re-election of the Presi-
dent.''139 The burglars later claimed that they believed they were on a
mission related to national security. Throughout the parallel jour-
nalist and FBI investigations into impropriety, President Nixon grew
concerned with the imminent uncovering of his campaign's and ad-
ministration's involvements in the illegal activities, attempting to
draw the investigators off his trail by telling the FBI it was risking di-
vulging sensitive national-security information.1 42  President Nixon
later asserted that "when the President does it, that means that it is
not illegal.' 43  Congress and the Gerald Ford administration re-
sponded with investigations into the effects of the surveillance activi-
ties of President Nixon and others144 on the individual rights of
Americans. 145
1 Alfred E. Lewis, 5 Held in Plot to Bug Democrats' Office Here, WASH. POST, June 18, 1972, at
A01.
137 Bob Woodward & Carl Bernstein, GOP Security Aide Among Five Arrested in Bugging Affair,
WASH. POST, June 19, 1972, at A01.
138 Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, Bug Suspect Got Campaign Funds, WASH. POST, Aug. 1,
1972, at A01.
,39 Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats, WASH. POST,
Oct. 10, 1972, at A01.
140 United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[A]ppellants now claim
that.., they sincerely, though erroneously, believed [they were] authorized by a 'government
intelligence agency,' to examine alleged financial ties between the Democratic Party and the
Castro regime in Cuba....").
141 The investigations mirrored each other because the Post's principal investigative reporters
on the case, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, were receiving inside information from "Deep
Throat," who was revealed more than three decades later as FBI Associate Director W. Mark
Felt. See David von Drehle, FBI's No. 2 Was 'Deep Throat" Mark Felt Ends 30-Year Mystery of the
Post's Watergate Source, WASH. POST,June 1, 2005, at A01.
142 President Nixon had his own Oval Office conversations bugged in an effort "to record
things for posterity, for the Nixon library" according to former White House aide Alexander P.
Butterfield. Lawrence Meyer, President Taped Talks, Phone Calls: Lanyer Ties Ehrlichman to Pay-
ments; Principal Offices Secretly Bugged Since Spring 1971, WASH. POST, July 17, 1973, at A01. Many
of these tapes were ultimately used against the President in the trial arising out of the Watergate
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affair. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (ruling that the President did not have
absolute immunity from prosecution and affirming the denial of a motion to quash a subpoena
for Oval Office tapes in an 8-0 decision (William Rehnquist, then the most junior associate Jus-
tice, abstained because of his former position in the Justice Department and relationship with
the underlying trial's named defendant, Attorney General John N. Mitchell)). In the "smoking
gun" tape, used as the prosecution's Exhibit 1, President Nixon and Chief of Staff Bob Halde-
man discussed a plan to have the CIA convince the FBI that their investigation was dredging up
sensitive issues involving national security:
When you get in these people when you ... get these people in, say: "Look, the problem
is that this will open the whole, the whole Bay of Pigs thing, and the President just feels
that" ah, without going into the details... don't, don't lie to them to the extent to say
there is no involvement, but just say this is sort of a comedy of errors, bizarre, without
getting into it, "the President believes that it is going to open the whole Bay of Pigs thing
up again. And ah, because these people are plugging for, for keeps and that they should
call the FBI in and say that we wish for the country, don't go any further into this case",
period!
Transcript of a Recording of a Meeting Between the President and H.R. Haldeman in the Oval
Office on June 23, 1972 from 10:04 to 11:39 a.m., United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 191,
Crim. No. 74-110 (D.D.C. 1975) (words of President Nixon).
143 David Frost Interviews Richard Nixon (television broadcast May 19, 1977). Nevertheless,
Presidents can and are held to objective legal standards:
[Political leaders] are likely to treat all moral criticism as an illegitimate displacement of
political controversy.... Legal accusation can be a very powerful form of political attack,
but though it is often used in that way, and often degraded in the use, it remains true
nevertheless that political leaders are bound by the legal code and can rightly be charged
and punished for criminal acts.
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 291 (3d ed. 2000); cf Nixon, 418 U.S. at 715 ("[A] President is [not in any sense]
above the law.").
1 Congress was wary of several examples of executive abuses of political eavesdropping un-
der the guise of national security:
(1) Installation in 1969 of warrantless wiretaps on 13 Government officials and four
newsmen, purportedly because they were leaking or publishing sensitive foreign intelli-
gence information. Two of these wiretaps were even continued after their subjects had
left Government service and had begun working on Senator Muskie's presidential cam-
paigu[;]
(2) White House authorization in 1969 of a burglary of the home of newspaper colum-
nistJoseph Kraft for installation of an alleged national security wiretap[;]
(3) Invocation of national security in inducing the CIA to assist in the burglary of Daniel
Ellsberg's psychiatrist's offices[;]
(4) The 1970 drafting by the White House of a plan to engage in massive warrantless
wiretapping and burglary which, although approved on national security grounds, was
scrapped after objections from FBI Director Hoover[; and]
(5) Surveillance by the Kennedy Administration of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and other
civil rights activists who were suspected of being Communist sympathizers or dupes.
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 635-36 n.107 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc plurality opinion)
(internal citations omitted). The Church Committee, the Senate committee formed to look
into such abuses, noted rampant nefarious historical examples:
Since the early 1930's, intelligence agencies have frequently wiretapped and bugged
American citizens without the benefit of a judicial wan-ant.... [P]ast subjects of these
surveillances have included a United States Congressman, a Congressional staff member,
journalists and newsmen, and numerous individuals and groups who engaged in no
criminal activity and who posed no genuine threat to national security, such as two White
House reporters and an anti-Vietnam War protest group.
S. REP. NO. 95-604, supra note 134, at 12.
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In 1978, against this backdrop, Congress passed the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act. 46 FISA was Congress's and the President's
attempt to provide a framework for foreign-intelligence surveillance
that took into account the need for both national security and the
preservation of civil liberties. 147 FISA sets out "the exclusive means by
which [foreign intelligence] electronic surveillance .. and the inter-
ception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may
be conducted.' ' 48  President Bush's NSA surveillance program con-
sisted of exactly the sort of activities FISA sought to regulate. 49  Con-
gress proscribed certain presidential action in FISA's section
15 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 94-755, bk. If (1976) (investigating the effects of government intelli-
gence activities on the rights of Americans); see also COMM'N ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE
U.S., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 3-5 (1975) (assessing CIA activities in light of "the [Commis-
sion] members' deep concern for both individual rights and national security"). For a discus-
sion of the historical context of these investigations, see Banks & Bowman, supra note 98, at 32-
35.
146 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1871
(2000 & Supp. IV 2004), amended by USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-178, §§ 3-4, 120 Stat. 278, 278-81 and USA PATRIOT Improve-
ment and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ 105-106, 108-109, 128, 506, 120
Stat. 192, 195-200, 203-05, 228-29, 247-48 (2006)). Senator Patrick Leahy observed the con-
nection between the executive abuses of the seventies and the passage of FISA:
FISA was originally enacted in the 1970s to curb widespread abuses by Presidents and
former FBI officials of bugging and wiretapping Americans without any judicial war-
rant-based on the Executive Branch's unilateral determination that national security
justified the surveillance. The targets of those wiretaps included a Member and staff of
the United States Congress, White House domestic affairs advisors, jotrnalists and many
individuals and organizations engaged in no criminal activity but, like Dr. Martin Luther
King, who expressed political views threatening to those in power.
The USA PATRIOT Act in Practice: Shedding Light on the FISA Process; Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). For a more in-depth treat-
ment of the historical background for the Act, see generally Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls
(and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1989).
147 See The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Statement on Signing S. 1566 into
Law, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1853, 1853 (Oct. 25, 1978) ("[O]ne of the most difficult tasks in a free soci-
ety like our own is the correlation between adequate intelligence to guarantee our Nation's se-
curity on the one hand, and the preservation of basic human rights on the other." (quoting
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance: Remarks of the President, Attorney General Bell, and Several
Members of Congress on Proposed Legislation, 2 PUB. PAPERS 921, 921 (May 18, 1977))).
President James E. Carter added of FISA, "This is a difficult balance to strike, but the act I am
signing today strikes it." Id.; see also S. REP. No. 95-604, supra note 134, at 16 ("The bill provides
external and internal checks on the executive."). See generally Ira S. Shapiro, The Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act: Legislative Balancing of National Security and the Fourth Amendment, 15 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 119 (1978) (concluding that the Act is an appropriate balance of constitutional in-
terests).
14 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2) (f) (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (emphasis added).
149 See Senate Judiciary Surveillance Hearing, supra note 49 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy,
Ranking Member, S.Judiciary Comm.) ("On July 31, 2002, the Justice Department testified that
[FISA] 'is a highly flexible statute that has proven effective' and noted: 'When you are trying to
prevent terrorist acts, that is really what FISA was intended to do and it was written with that in
mind.'").
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1809 (a) (1), which declares, "A person is guilty of an offense if he in-
tentionally engages in electronic surveillance under color of law ex-
cept as authorized by statute.' 150  The NSA wiretapping program al-
most certainly violated this provision.
The administration essentially conceded that most of this provi-
sion applies to its actions. 5' It seems likely that the wiretapping in
question constituted "electronic surveillance" as defined in section
1801 (f) .152 It is equally likely that the program met the "color of law"
element because the President and the NSA were conducting such
surveillance in their official capacity and thus "clothed with the au-
thority of the state. ' Given the administration's statements after the
150 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (2000).
151 See, e.g., Charles Lane, White House Elaborates on Authority for Eavesdropping, WASH. POST,
Dec. 20, 2005, at A10 (noting that the President is arguing that he has inherent authority and
that the authority was supplemented by congressional resolution, but not denying that he inten-
tionally authorized the surveillance); Eric Lichtblau &James Risen, Legal Rationale by Justice Dept.
on Spying Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at Al (reporting a Justice Department white paper
that makes similar arguments); Gonzales & Hayden, supra note 43 ("[FISA] requires a court
order before engaging in this kind of surveillance that I've just discussed and the President an-
nounced on Saturday, unless there is somehow-there is-unless otherwise authorized by stat-
ute or by Congress. That's what the law requires." (statement of Attorney General Gonzales)).
152 The technical aspects of the program are still hazy. See supra Part I. However, the defini-
tion from the Act is sufficiently broad to cover the common definition of electronic surveillance
to which the administration has admitted, especially the general second definition:
"Electronic surveillance" means-
(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the con-
tents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, without the
consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States....
50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000 & Supp. I 2001), amended by USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reau-
thorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 506(a) (5), 120 Stat. 192, 248 (2006). Admini-
stration officials have been willing to assume arguendo that the activities do constitute "elec-
tronic surveillance" within the meaning of FISA. See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Surveillance Hearing,
supra note 49 (statement of Attorney General Gonzales) ("Because I cannot discuss operational
details, for purposes of this discussion, I will assume that intercepts of international al Qaeda
communications under the terrorist surveillance program fall within the definition of 'elec-
tronic surveillance' in FISA."); cf Memorandum of the Constitution Project and the Center for
National Security Studies in Response to U.S. Department of Justice's Defense of Warrantless
Electronic Surveillance at 6, In re Warrantless Electronic Surveillance (FISA Ct. Feb. 28, 2006)
(no docket number because the amicus memo was filed generally, not in response to a particu-
lar case) [hereinafter Constitution Project Memorandum] ("[T]he seminal fact necessary for [the
determination that the surveillance in unlawful] is not meaningfully in dispute: the President
has authorized "electronic surveillance" as defined by FISA without seeking or obtaining the
warrants that FISA requires.").
153 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 282 (8th ed. 2004). FISA does not provide a statutory definition
of "color of law." Cases dealing with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have determined that that statute's "color
of law" language requires merely a Fourteenth Amendment state action. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) ("The ultimate issue in determining whether [an action is
,under color of law'] is the same question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights 'fairly attributable to the State?'" (quoting
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982))); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,
794 n.7 (1966) ("In cases under § 1983, 'under color' of law has consistently been treated as the
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news broke, the intentionality of its actions is beyond question.1 54 The
crucial issue, then, is whether the program is excepted under FISA
because it is "authorized by statute." 5
A. Statutory Authorization Under FISA ?
FISA contains three "emergency" provisions that allow surveil-
lance without a warrant. Two of these have time frames that are too
short to allow for the ongoing NSA program, 56 and the third, as we
shall see, is too restricted in scope to provide authorization for it.
Section 1802(a) (1) authorizes warrantless surveillance similar to
that undertaken by the NSA, but the lawful program varies in several
important respects. First, it requires that the surveillance be "solely
directed" at "communications used exclusively between or among
foreign powers, as defined in section [1801] (a) (1), (2), or (3)" or at
"technical intelligence.., under the open and exclusive control of a
foreign power" as defined in the same section.157 The definition of
"foreign power" in section 1801 includes six alternatives, of which
only the first three qualify as targets of warrantless surveillance:
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof whether or not rec-
ognized by the United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of
United States persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or
governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government
158
or governments ....
Suspected members of or sympathizers with al-Qaeda and other ter-
rorist groups, the targets of the NSA wiretapping program, were bet-
ter candidates for fitting one of the other three definitions of "for-
eign power"-" (4) a group engaged in international terrorism or
activities in preparation therefor; (5) a foreign-based political organi-
zation, not substantially composed of United States persons; or (6) an
entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or gov-
same thing as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment."). By this stan-
dard, it is clear that surveillance by the National Security Agency on behalf of the President
takes place "under color of law."
154 See, e.g., Schmitt & Curtius, supra note 32 (reporting Bush's justification for his actions).
155 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (2000).
156 Id. § 1805 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (allowing the attorney general to authorize emergency
wiretapping so long as a FISA court order is sought and obtained within seventy-two hours) (see
infra Conclusion); id. § 1811 (allowing the President to authorize warrantless wiretapping for
the first fifteen days after a congressional declaration of war) (see infta notes 164-65 and ac-
companying text).
157 Id. § 1802 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
158 Id. § 1801 (2000 & Supp. I 2001), amended &y USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reau-
thorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 506(a) (5), 120 Stat. 192, 248 (2006).
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ernments" 15"9-but these three definitions are explicitly excluded as
legitimate targets of emergency warrantless wiretapping under sec-
tion 1802(a) (1).
Furthermore, the section 1802 warrantless-wiretapping provision
requires that "there [be] no substantial likelihood that the surveil-
lance will acquire the contents of any communication to which a
United States person is a party,"'1 60 which clearly eliminates the appli-
cable conduct of the NSA under the Bush program. "United States
person" is defined in section 1801(i) as "a citizen of the United
States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence," or an as-
sociation or corporation with sufficient ties to the United States.'6'
Because the NSA program was spying on communications where one
party was inside the United States,16 it is undeniable that it captured
conversations where a United States person was a party,'63 or at least
that the surveillance was undertaken when there was a "substantial
likelihood" that it would capture such conversations. Since some sur-
veillance under the program targeted "United States persons" rather
than "foreign powers," section 1802(a) affords no exception to the
general requirement of a warrant.
FISA's section 1811 also provides an emergency exception under
which the President can authorize warrantless surveillance during
time of war, but only for a period of fifteen days immediately follow-
ing a congressional declaration of war.'6 Since this program lasted
significantly longer than fifteen days, it finds no justification in sec-
tion 1811. FISA cannot be construed to give the President carte
blanche for electronic foreign-intelligence surveillance without a
court order in light of its provisions explicitly limiting such authority
to the fifteen-day period after Congress declares war, to a seventy-two
hour period preceding a post-hoc order, or to situations that target
limited types of foreign powers and do not risk capture of the conver-
sations of United States persons.165
159 Id.
160 Id. § 1802 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
11 Id. § 1801 (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
162 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 15; Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 48.
163 See, e.g., Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 15 (noting that the program "helped uncover a plot
by lyman Faris, an Ohio trucker and naturalized citizen," presumably by targeting his phone
conversations).
164 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000).
165 In a letter to leaders of Congress responding to a Department of Justice white paper mak-
ing the case for the program, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITY SUPPORTING THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 2 (2006), available
at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/nsa/dojnsa1l906wp.pdf, fourteen distinguished pro-
fessors analogously argued that section 1811 of FISA should be read in counterpoint to the Au-
thorization for Use of Military Force against. terrorists: "Since Congress specifically provided
that even a declaration of war-a more formal step than an authorization to use military force-
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B. Statutory Authorization Under the AUMF?
The other candidate for providing statutory authorization, the Au-
thorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against terrorists, 66 also
falls short of defeating the general prohibition against warrantless
surveillance. The brief resolution straightforwardly authorizes the
President
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organiza-
tions, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or har-
bored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts
of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, or-
ganizations, or persons.161
The administration and its supporters vehemently argued that this
resolution, passed a week after the 9/11 attacks, grants authority for
the warrantless wiretapping program.' 6 Upon examination of the
statutory text itself, the Court's interpretation thereof in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld,"9 and the relationship of the joint resolution to another,
contemporaneous statute, the program was outside the purview of
the AUMF.
The President's actions are directly constrained by the AUMF's
own terms. The AUMF was meant to authorize the war against the
Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and surrounding regions; its
text was left indefinite because it remained unclear in those first few
days after the 9/11 attacks who exactly was responsible. While it
would authorize only fifteen days of warrantless surveillance, one cannot reasonably conclude
that the AUMF provides the President with unlimited and indefinite warrantless wiretapping
authority." Letter from Curtis A. Bradley, Professor of Law, Duke Univ., et al. to
Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, et al. (Feb. 2, 2006), available at
htt1 ;//balkin.blogspot.com/FISA.AUMF.ReplytoDOJ.pdf [hereinafter Professors' Letter].
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
167 Id.
168 See David Johnston & Linda Greenhouse, '01 Resolution Is Central to '05 Controversy, N.Y.
TiMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at A25 ("President Bush cited the resolution ... on Monday at his news
conference. So did Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, who in a session with reporters said
the Congressional measure.., gave the government the power 'to engage in this kind of signals
intelligence.'"); U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 165 ("The AUMF places the President at the
zenith of his powers in authorizing the NSA activities.").
169 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
170 See generally 147 CONG. REc. S9416-21, H5632-83 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001) (debating the
indeterminate language of the joint resolution yet generally supporting its passage as a show of
unity). Some have argued that the broad language was more significant than a mere demon-
stration of a lack of certainty. See, e.g., Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney
General, to Pat Roberts, Chairman, Sen. Select Comm. on Intelligence, et al. (Dec. 22, 2005),
available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB178/surv34.pdf ("The AUMF
cannot be read as limited to authorizing the use of force against Afghanistan .... Indeed, those
who directly 'committed' the attacks of September 11 resided in the United States for months
before those attacks."). Whether or not Congress intended to limit the authorization to inter-
national warfare, it certainly did not intend it to include permission for surveillance actions that
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may be "necessary and appropriate" to detain enemies captured in
Afghanistan to prevent them from returning to the battlefield, 7 1 the
appropriateness of warrantless domestic wiretapping is in question
because it was proscribed by law at the time of the authorization.
Further, the object of the AUMF is "force," which in its plain mean-
172ing seems to contemplate the action of "detention" but not "wire-
tapping.'
173
If the reactions of many senators and representatives after the
wiretapping story broke were any indication of their legislative intent,
they appeared unlikely to have agreed to include authorization for
the program in the AUMF 7 4  Several senators have spoken out
overrode FISA and so profoundly affected the rights of Americans without more specific statu-
torx authorization. See infra notes 172-74 and surrounding text.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
172 "Power, violence, or pressure directed against a person or thing." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 673 (8th ed. 2004). Webster's offers a more in-depth examination of the many
senses of the word, but none appear to apply to surveillance:
[S]trength or energy exerted or brought to bear: cause of motion or change : active
power... military strength... a body (as of troops or ships) assigned to a military pur-
pose.., a body of persons or things available for a particular end.., an individual or
group having the power of effective action ... violence, compulsion, or constraint ex-
erted upon or against a person or thing ....
Force, in MERRIAM-WAEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 489 (11th ed. 2004).
173 Justice Clarence Thomas, in his Hamdi dissent, was persuaded by the administration's ar-
gument that intelligence was linked with detention: "[D]etention can serve to gather critical
intelligence regarding the intentions and capabilities of our adversaries, a function that the
Government avers has become all the more important in the war on terrorism." Hamdi, 542
U.S. at 595 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 15,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696)). The plurality Justices did not address
intelligence gathering as a force or purpose of force.
174 The first Republican on either chamber's judiciary committee to call for an inquiry into
the constitutionality and legality of the program was Rep. Heather Wilson of New Mexico.
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Republican Speaks Up, Leading Others to Challenge Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
11, 2006, at Al. Republican Senators Olympia Sn'owe and Chuck Hagel also expressed concern
about the program. Charles Babington, White House Working to Avoid Wiretap Probe, but Some Re-
publicans Say Bush Must Be More Open About Eavesdropping Program, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2006, at
A08. Pat Roberts, Republican chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, declared that he
would prefer the surveillance be brought under FISA Court authority. Sheryl Gay Stolberg with
Elisabeth Bumiller, Senate Chairman Splits with Bush on Spy Program, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at
Al. Senator Roberts, however, also argued that a legislative change would eliminate the need
for an inquiry. Editorial, Doing the President's Dirty Work, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at A22. But
cf Maura Reynolds, Consensus Grows for Curbs on Surveillance: A Senate Panel Goes behind Closed
Doors to Hear More About Bush's Program of Warrantless Eavesdropping, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2006, at
A26 ("[Senator Russell] Feingold said such legislation would not remove the need to hold the
administration accountable for any improprieties already committed. 'You can't fix illegality
after the fact,' Feingold said."). On February 26, 2006, eighteen House Democrats wrote to
President Bush to urge him to direct the Attorney General to appoint a special counsel to inves-
tigate the impropriety of the program. Letter from Zoe Lofgren et al. to the President (Feb. 26,
2006), reprinted in Press Release, Members of Congress Call for Special Counsel Investigation
into NSA Domestic Spying After Being Refused by Government Agencies
(Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/cal6_lofgren/
022706_LofgrenSpecial-Counsel-letter.html. Compare 152 CONG. REC. S1457-58 (daily ed.
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against the NSA program, including President Bush's fellow Republi-
cans Senator Arlen Specter, who has held hearings into the legality
and constitutionality of the program, and Senator John McCain, who
"said he did not think the president had the legal authority for this
operation, adding that the White House should seek Congressional
approval to alter the 1978 provisions if it thinks they are not working
now."75  Senator Russell Feingold noted that "[n]obody, nobody
thought when we passed a resolution to invade Afghanistan and to
fight the war on terror-including myself who voted for it-that this
was an authorization to allow a wiretapping against the law of the
United States.'
176
The AUMF should not be read to repeal or amend the FISA pro-
cedures because it is too vague. The Supreme Court frowns upon
"repeals by implication,' 77 and has held that "[o]nly a clear repug-
nancy between the old law and the new results in the former giving
Feb. 17, 2006) (statement of Sen. Byrd) ("[The administration's] arguments are transparently
contrived, intellectually deficient, indefensible excuses being served up like tripe to silence le-
gitimate criticism of the White House, a White House so infused with its own hubris that it has
talked itself into believing that its inhabitants are above the law."), and 152 CONG. REC. H63
(daily ed. Feb. 1, 2006) (statement of Rep. Scott of Virginia) ("A review of wiretaps.. . is appro-
priate, the roving wiretaps and... the President's new NSA policy which many legal scholars
believe are just illegal. Those are spying on domestic law-abiding citizens. If there is probable
cause that someone is breaking the law, obviously a criminal warrant could be given."), with 152
CONG. REc. H335-36 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 2006) (statement of Rep. Foxx of North Carolina) ("I
don't know about you, but I want to use all the tools in our arsenal to catch the terrorists and
prevent another 9/11."), 152 CONG. REC. H227 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Miller of Michigan) ("I do not care one iota about protecting the privacy of terrorists who have
been sent to this country to murder innocent Americans."), 152 CONG. REC. S877-79 (daily ed.
Feb. 9, 2006) (statement of Sen. Sessions) ("It is time for us to realize that we are in a
war .... Our military and our intelligence agencies have been charged by us-indeed, they
have been criticized by us for not being effective enough in this effort."), and 152 CONG. REC.
S783-84 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2006) (statement of Sen. McConnell) ("To combat this deadly threat,
the President has rightly-rightly-asserted his constitutional authority to use every tool at his
disposal to fight the war on terror. One of those tools is the NSA's terrorist surveillance pro-
gram.").
175 Adam Nagourney, Seeking Edge in Spy Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at Al; see also Senate
Judiciary Surveillance Heaing, supra note 49 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member,
S. Judiciary Comm.) ("[The AUMF] did not authorize domestic surveillance of United States
citizens without a warrant from a judge. Nothing in the Authorization for the Use of Military
Force was intended secretly to undermine the liberties and rights of Americans....").
1 Johnston & Greenhouse, supra note 168; cf 152 CONG. REC. S2013 (daily ed. Mar. 13,
2006) (statement of Sen. Feingold) ("Members of Congress did not pass this resolution to give
the President blanket authority to order warrantless wiretaps .... Anyone in this body who tells
you otherwise either was not there at the time or isn't telling the truth. We authorized the
President to use military force in Afghanistan ....").
177 United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 452-53 (1988) (quoting Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324
U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945)).
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way and then only pro tanto to the extent of the repugnancy.0178 The
intent to change the existing law must be "clear and manifest" in the179
new one. Since the AUMF does not specifically address the proce-
dures outlined in FISA, or even expressly mention foreign-
intelligence surveillance, it is too ambiguous to repeal or amend the
former statute and must be interpreted as contemplating FISA and
avoiding conflict with it in order to "harmonize the impact of the two
statutes."
18 0
The Supreme Court interpreted the scope of the AUMF in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld.18" ' Yaser Esam Hamdi, a Louisiana-born U.S. citizen who
lived in the Middle East most of his life, had been captured in Af-
ghanistan by the Northern Alliance and turned over to the U.S. mili-
tary, which, suspecting him of taking up arms alongside the enemy
Taliban, detained him as an "enemy combatant" first at Guantdnamo
and then in various naval brigs.1 2 In determining whether the Execu-
tive had the authority to detain enemy combatants captured in Af-
ghanistan, the main plurality opinion, authored by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, declined to address the question of plenary authority un-
der Article II, instead ruling that the AUMF granted such authority.1
83
178 Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. at 457 (citing United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198
(1939)); cf Lockhart v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 699, 703-04 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that the Court has an "already-powerful presumption against implied repeals").
179 Borden, 308 U.S. at 198 (quoting Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S. 596, 602 (1883)).
180 United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530 (1998); cf Memorandum from David
Kris 3-4 (Jan. 25, 2006), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/kris.fisa.pdf (arguing that the
AUMF must not be construed as an authorization for a program that violates FISA, and suggest-
ing that the AUMF may not even count as a "statute" that can "authorize" surveillance outside
the purview of FISA because it does not explicitly repeal FISA provisions, by noting that constru-
ing FISA as a whole, "the penalty provision's reference to surveillance 'authorized by statute' is
best read to incorporate another statute only if it is listed in the exclusivity provision (or ... if it
effects an implicit repeal or amendment of that provision)"). This reading of FISA would pre-
clude authorization through the AUMF even if surveillance was read into its scope.181 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
182 Id. at 510.
183 Id. at 516-17. Hamdi has been interpreted as both an assertion of thejudiciary's power to
review wartime executive decisions and an example of judicial deference thereto. See Nicholas
G. Green, Note, A "Blank Check": Judicial Review and the War Powers in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 56
S.C. L. REV. 581, 581, 581 nn.6 & 7, 599-605 (2005) ("[T]he Court chose to defer to the Presi-
dent rather than exercise the judicial power it appeared to support."). These differing inter-
pretations may come as no surprise in light of the profound fragmentedness of the judgment,
which featured four distinct opinions, none of which were joined by five of the nine justices.
Justice Thomas, dissenting as to the judgment because of a disagreement over the rigor with
which the judiciary was permitted to review wartime executive decisions, sided with the four
justices joined on the plurality opinion (Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, andJustices
Anthony Kennedy and Stephen Breyer) in determining that Hamdi's detention was within the
scope of the AUMF. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice David Souter,
joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, wrote separately to argue that, while the Court did have
judicial review power, the AUMF did not confer authority for the detention. Id. at 540-41
(Souter,J., dissenting). Justice Antonin Scalia, in rare opposition to Justice Thomas, penned a
dissent joined by justice John Paul Stevens contending that, beyond justice Souter's view, Con-
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In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered both the individu-
als targeted by the President's action and the nature of the action it-
self:
There can be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United
States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to
have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those at-
tacks, are individuals Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF. We
conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category
we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which
they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as
to be an exercise of the "necessary and appropriate force" Congress has
authorized the President to use.
Justice O'Connor reiterated that "the capture, detention, and trial of
unlawful combatants, by 'universal agreement and practice,' are 'im-
portant incident[s] of war,"'.. and that
it is of no moment that the AUMF does not use specific language of de-
tention. Because detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battle-
field is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of
.necessary and appropriate force," Congress has clearly and unmistakably
authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here.
The executive authority for detention granted by the AUMF and rec-
ognized by the plurality is not absolute; it exists only where "it is suffi-
ciently clear that the individual is, in fact, an enemy combatant" be-
cause of concession or "proof of enemy-combatant status in a
proceeding that comports with due process. 1 7 Hamdi thus provides a
rule for determining whether a particular executive action not explic-
itly mentioned in the AUMF is nevertheless within its purview: the
action must be directed toward individuals targeted by Congress and
must be a "fundamental," "accepted," or "important". "incident of
war" or "incident of waging war."
The administration and President Bush's supporters argue that
warrantless electronic surveillance is a fundamental incident of wag-
ing war. 8 They may be partly correct: intelligence-gathering,
broadly defined, could be construed as a fundamental incident of
gress could not confer authority for enemy-combatant detention of an American citizen unless it
specifically suspended habeas corpus according to the Suspension Clause of Article I, Section 9,
which it had not. Id. at 554 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
184 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion).
185 Id. (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)).
186 Id. at 519. But see id. at 536 ("[A] state of war is not a blank check for the President when
it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens."); cf. H.W.R. WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 285 (2d
ed. 1967) ("It is not surprising that the Crown, having been given a blank cheque, yielded to the
temptation to overdraw.").
187 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 523.
188 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 165, at 14 ("Warrantless intelligence surveil-
lance against the enemy is a fundamental incident of the use of military force ....").
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war. Indeed, as a Justice Department white paper noted in the wake
of the wiretapping revelations,"9 the Supreme Court has ruled on the
importance of intelligence collection in wartime. In Totten v. United
States, the Court recognized that President Lincoln "was undoubtedly
authorized during the war, as commander-in-chief of the armies of
the United States, to employ secret agents to enter the rebel lines and
obtain information respecting the strength, resources, and move-
ments of the enemy."' 9  Still, that case, and those that followed it,
dealt with the President's use of spies, not electronic surveillance.
Human spies have been a necessary part of wartime intelligence-
gathering for millennia.' 9' In relation to other forms of intelligence
gathering, electronic surveillance is by its nature more problematic.
Wiretapping gathers information more generally, extends less defi-
nitely, and records more concretely than a traditional search. 92 Fur-
ther, the administration could have opted to conduct its intelligence-
gathering through electronic surveillance while still abiding by ac-
cepted legal procedures, namely by securing a court order. Though
193the administration cited some historic examples of its use, war-
189 Id.
190 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1876); cf Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 5 (2005) (affirming the Totten rule
.prohibiting suits against the Government based on covert espionage agreements" as applied to
Cold War spies as well).
191 See, e.g., Faye Bowers and Jonathan S. Landay, Terrorist Threat Spurs New Debate on 'Human'
Spies, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Boston), Aug. 2, 1996, at 1 (linking the capture of Ramzi Yousef
to human informants and discussing the necessity of actual spies above and beyond high-tech
methods); Rafael Lorente, Budget Hike Will Spread Spy Net: U.S. Must Catch up, Graham Says, SUN-
SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 6, 2001, at 10A (highlighting increased funding for spies
as the aim of a new congressional intelligence-budget bill); Warren P. Strobel, Decision Comes at
Bad Time for Bush, Agency, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 4, 2004, at 9A ("Within the CIA, officials
said, more must be done to create a cadre of highly trained human spies who can crack terrorist
c~lls or weapons-smuggling rings."). As fictional White House press secretary C.J. Cregg put it,
We need spies-human spies. Spy satellites are great if you're trying to detect whether
or not Kruschev's put missiles in Cuba, but if you want to overhear a conversation over
Turkish coffee in Khyber Pass, you need a spy. You guys want to get a great job after col-
lege and serve your country? Study Arabic, Chinese, and Farsi.
The West Wing: Isaac and Ishmael (NBC television broadcast Oct. 3, 2001).
192 Solove, supra note 15, at 1269. Wiretapping is additionally problematic because it invades
the privacy of not only its target, but also all those who have phone conversations with him or
her. See id. ("As Justice Douglas observed, wiretapping can become 'a dragnet, sweeping in all
conversations within its scope.'" (quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 65 (1967) (Douglas,
J., concurring))).
193 See U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 165, at 16-17 (noting uses of warrantiess surveillance
in the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and both World Wars). The administration points
specifically to an example of President Franklin Roosevelt authorizing surveillance arguably in
violation of statute. See Gonzales Letter, supra note 41 ("President Roosevelt authorized this
activity notwithstanding the language of 47 U.S.C. § 605, ... which, at the time, provided that
'no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge
or publish [it].'" (citing Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000))). In-
deed, the authorization came on the heels of a Supreme Court decision applying the provision
to the activities of government officials. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383-84
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rantless wiretapping itself cannot be considered "fundamental" when
there are feasible, less insidious alternatives for collecting intelli-
gence.
Whether or not the action undertaken in the NSA program was a
"fundamental incident of war," the Hamdi analysis of the AUMF re-
quires that it also be directed toward individuals Congress "sought to
target. ' 94 While those "who fought against the United States in Af-
ghanistan as part of the Taliban" qualified,195 citizens and permanent
residents carrying on telephone or e-mail conversations inside the
(1937) ("[W]e think another well recognized principle leads to the application of the statute as
it is written so as to include within its sweep federal officers as well as others. That principle is
that the sovereign is embraced by general words of a statute intended to prevent injury and
wrong."). The May 1940 memorandum to Attorney General Robert H. Jackson concerning the
need for wiretapping was mindful of the statute and Nardone decision:
I have agreed with the broad purpose of the Supreme Court decision relating to
wiretapping in investigations. The Court is undoubtedly sound both in regard to the use
of evidence secured over tapped wires in the prosecution of citizens in criminal cases;
and it is also right in its opinion that under ordinary and normal circumstances wiretap-
ping by Government agents should not be carried on for the excellent reason that it is
almost bound to lead to abuse of civil rights.
However, I am convinced that the Supreme Court never intended any dictum in the
particular case which it decided to apply to grave matters involving the defense of the
nation.
You are, therefore, authorized and directed in such cases as you may approve, after
investigation of the need in each case, to authorize the necessary investigating agents
that they are at liberty to secure information by listening devices directed to the conver-
sation or other communications of persons suspected of subversive activities against the
Government of the United States, including suspected spies. You are requested fur-
thermore to limit these investigations so conducted to a minimum and to limit them in-
sofar as possible to aliens.
Confidential Memorandum from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Attorney General Robert
H. Jackson (May 21, 1941), reprinted in S. REP. No. 94-755, bk. III, at 279 (1976). The Attorney
General justified the discrepancy by applying the text of the statute to the administration's ac-
tions: "The only offense under the present law is to intercept any communication and divulge
or publish the same ... Any person, with no risk of penalty, may tap telephone wires.., and act
upon what he hears or make any use of it that does not involve divulging or publication." S.
REP. No. 94-755, bk. II, at 280 (1976) (quoting Letter from Attorney General Robert H. Jack-
son to Rep. Hatton Summers (Mar. 19, 1941) (emphasis in S. REP.)). Congress and the courts
acquiesced to this reading of section 605:
The import of these two statements was undoubtedly clear to the members of the House
Judiciary Committee to whom they were addressed. The FBI would use wiretaps in the
investigation of espionage and sabotage, despite the Federal Communications Act, since
the results of the wiretaps would not be "divulged" outside the government. Legislation
was needed only in order to use wiretap-obtained evidence or the fruits thereof in crimi-
nal prosecutions; a new statute was not necessary if the purpose of wiretapping was to
gather intelligence that would not be used in court.
Id. After 1978 and until President Bush's NSA program, however, no President authorized war-
rantless surveillance in contradiction of FISA. See Gonzales Letter, supra note 41 ("If the ques-
tion is limited to 'electronic surveillance' as defined by FISA,... we are unaware of any such
authorizations.").
194 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion).
195 Id.
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United States did not. While Hamdi noted that the AUMF language is
broad, 196 the language is not as broad as the administration would
have liked it to be or as Congress contemplated. An original White
House proposal to Congress the day after 9/11 would have granted
executive authority for "the use of military force to 'deter and pre-
empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United
States.''117 The actual text of the AUMF, adopted by Congress on
September 14, 2001,198 was meant as a more narrow authorization
"den [ying] the president the more expansive authority he sought and
insist[ing] that his authority be used specifically against Osama bin
Laden and al Qaeda."' 99 Senator Tom Daschle, who as minority
leader took part in the negotiations over the particular language of
the resolution, recounted an additional rejection:
Just before the Senate acted on this compromise resolution, the White
House sought one last change. Literally minutes before the Senate cast
its vote, the administration sought to add the words "in the United States
and" after "appropriate force" in the agreed-upon text. This last-minute
change would have given the president broad authority to exercise ex-
pansive powers not just overseas-where we all understood he wanted au-
thority to act-but right here in the United States, potentially against
American citizens. I could see no justification for Congress to accede to
this extraordinary request for additional authority. I refused:
°
196 Id. at 517-18.
197 Tom Daschle, Op-Ed., Power We Didn't Grant, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2005, at A21.
198 The resolution was passed by both chambers of Congress the Friday following the 9/11
attacks, a day the President declared a "National Day of Prayer and Remembrance." Debates
occurred deep in the shadow of that tragedy and tribute. See 147 CONG. REC. S9411 (daily ed.
Sept. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Daschle) ("I also remind Senators that there is a memorial
service at the National Cathedral at noon.... [W]e will be boarding [buses] a little later than
[10 o'clock] to accommodate whatever other considerations there will be this morning."); Re-
marks at the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1108 (Sept. 14,
2001) (eulogizing the victims of the attacks at the National Cathedral).
99 Daschle, supra note 197.
2M Id.; see also Barton Gellman, Daschle: Congress Denied Bush War Powers in U.S., WASH. POST,
Dec. 23. 2005, at A04 ("[The disclosure] suggests that Congress refused explicitly to grant au-
thority that the Bush administration now asserts is implicit in the resolution."). The proposed
language would have changed the wording of the resolution to authorize the "use [of] all nec-
essary and appropriate force in the United States and against those nations, organizations, or per-
sons [the President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 11, 2001 .. .. " Id. Senator Carl Levin elaborated on the nature of
the change during floor debate on the resolution:
I believe it is also important to note that this authorization for the use of force is lim-
ited to the nations, organizations, or persons involved in the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11. It is not a broad authorization for the use of military force against any nation,
organization, or persons who were not involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks.
This joint resolution is based upon and is an exercise of the Congress' constitutional
war powers role as codified in the War Powers Resolution. It also expressly confirms the
conditions on the exercise of Executive power under that resolution. In that regard, I
want to note that the statement in the last "Whereas" clause relating to the constitutional
authority of the President to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terror-
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This explicit rejection of permission to use force inside the United
States clearly puts the use of such force outside the scope of the final
AUMF.2 °' Though Congress can be said to have intended for the
President to use types of force not specifically outlined in the thinly
worded resolution, it cannot be said to have intended dominion it
directly declined to include. As Justice Frankfurter noted in the Steel
Seizure case,
It is one thing to draw an intention of Congress from general language
and to say that Congress would have explicitly written what is inferred,
where Congress has not addressed itself to a specific situation. It is quite
impossible, however, when Congress did specifically address itself to a
problem,... to find secreted in the interstices of legislation the very
grant of power which Congress consciously withheld. To find authority
so explicitly withheld is not merely to disregard in a particular instance
the clear will of Congress. It is to disrespect the whole legislative process
and the constitutional division of authority between President and Con-
203gress.
Even Attorney General Gonzales has acknowledged that Congress
would have been unwilling to directly and explicitly authorize a simi-
lar program: "We have had discussions with Congress in the past-
certain members of Congress-as to whether or not FISA could be
amended to allow us to adequately deal with this kind of threat, and
we were advised that that would be difficult, if not impossible., 20 4 If it
ism against the United States is to be read in conjunction with the War Powers Resolu-
tion. That is why words in earlier drafts of this joint resolution, which might have been interpreted
to grant a broader authority to use military force, were deleted and that is why the references to
the War Powers Resolution were added. It does not recognize any greater presidential
authority than is recognized by the War Powers Resolution nor does it grant any new au-
thority to the President.
147 CONG. REC. S9416 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Levin) (emphasis added).
201 Gellman, supra note 200.
202 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("[I]t is of no
moment that the AUMF does not use specific language of detention."); Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981) ("[Flailure of Congress specifically to delegate authority does
not, especially.., in the areas of foreign policy and national security, imply congressional dis-
approval of action taken by the Executive." (internal quotations omitted)).
203 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 609 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring); see also id. at 586 (majority opinion) (finding no statutory authority
granted for President Truman's wartime actions where a congressional committee explicitly
rejected a proposal to grant such authority); id. at 599-601 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The
Senate Labor Committee, through its Chairman, explicitly reported to the Senate that a general
grant of seizure powers had been considered and rejected in favor of reliance on ad hoc legisla-
tion .... Congress chose not to lodge this power in the President."); id. at 663 (Black, J., con-
curring) (reasoning that the rejection demonstrated congressional intent to withhold author-
ity); cf Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79 ("[Tlhe enactment of legislation closely related to
the question of the President's authority.., which evinces legislative intent to accord the Presi-
dent broad discretion may be considered to invite measures on independent presidential re-
sponsibility. At least this is so where there is no contrary indication of legislative intent .... (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis added)).
204 Gonzales & Hayden, supra note 43 (statement of Attorney General Gonzales).
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would have been "difficult, if not impossible" for Congress to agree to
directly authorize the program by amending FISA, it is unlikely that
Congress would have intended to authorize the program through the
AUMF. °0
A further argument of omission similarly implies that Congress
did not intend to authorize warrantless wiretapping: Congress ad-
dressed similar surveillance procedures with the USA PATRIOT Act
20 6
and Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002.207 The Su-
preme Court has held that "it is a fundamental canon of statutory
construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context
and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme," and so
courts must "interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent
regulatory scheme and fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious
whole. '0 8  The AUMF should be read in the context of the 9/11-
reponse statutory program of which it was a part. The USA PATRIOT
Act and the Intelligence Authorization Act, both of which, like the
AUMF, were passed shortly after the 9/11 attacks, explicitly amended
several provisions of FISA.2°9 Despite the warrantless-wiretapping pro-
205 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 19, Ctr.
for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-cv-313 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2006).
206 USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 27. The Act was signed into law on Oct. 26, 2001.
207 Pub. L. No. 107-108, 115 Stat. 1394 (2002).
208 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
E.g., Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 § 314 (amending several provi-
sions of FISA to extend the emergency post-hoc authorization period to seventy-two hours from
twenty-four and rearrange subsections); USA PATRIOT Act § 206 (providing authority for "rov-
ing surveillance" by amending 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c) (2) (B)); id. § 207 (extending the allowed
duration of surveillance of non-United States persons by amending several FISA provisions); id.
§ 208 (increasing the number of district court judges participating in FISA courts by amending
50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)); id. § 214 (widening scope of pen-register and tap-and-trace authority un-
der 50 U.S.C. §§ 1842-1843); id. § 215 (striking 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1863 to alter the protocol for
access to records); id. § 218 (requiring that the obtaining of foreign intelligence information be
only "a significant purpose" rather than "the purpose" of surveillance under 50 U.S.C.
§ 1804(a) (7) (B) and § 1823(a)(7) (B)); id. § 225 (creating civil immunity for those conducting
surveillance in compliance with FISA by amending 50 U.S.C. § 1805); id. § 504 (allowing coor-
dination between eavesdroppers and other law enforcement officials by amending 50 U.S.C.
§ 1806 and § 1825); id. § 1003 (amending the definition of "electronic surveillance" in 50
U.S.C. § 1801 (f) (2)). For a further exploration of the USA PATRIOT Act's impact on FISA and
the argument that its relaxing of FISA's foreign-intelligence purpose standard violates the
Fourth Amendment, see David Hardin, Note, The Fuss over Two Small Words: The Unconstitution-
ality of the USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to FISA Under the Fourth Amendment, 71 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 291, 294 (2003). See also Solove, supra note 15, at 1290 ("Previously, FISA applied only
when 'the purpose' of the investigation was to gather foreign intelligence; the USA PATRIOT
Act enlarged FISA's scope to apply when foreign intelligence gathering was 'a significant pur-
pose' of the investigation. This seemingly subtle change has potentially dramatic ramifica-
tions."). This alteration "[tore] down the 'wall' that had largely separated foreign intelligence
activities from the usual prosecution of domestic crimes." Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1306, 1307 (2004). The change, however,
relates to the purposes for which the government can wiretap, which is not at particular issue
[Vol. 9:1
THE WAR OF INFORMA TION
gram already being in effect at the time of the Act's passage,210 the Act
failed to explicitly amend title 50, sections 1809(a) (1), 1802(a), or
1801(a)(1), (2), or (3) of the U.S. Code to either make warrantless
wiretapping legal or provide an exception to the general rule of ille-
gality of warrantless wiretapping for the type of program undertaken
by the NSA. The administration claims that such revision was unnec-
essary because authority for warrantless wiretapping had already been
granted by the AUMF, but it remains unclear why the administra-
tion distinguishes between the warrantless wiretapping it claims is in-
herent in the AUMF and similar surveillance tools, such as roving
wiretaps212 and increased pen-register authority,212 it advocated to in-
when discussing the NSA program that explicitly seeks foreign intelligence; the change leaves
unaffected restrictions on whom wiretaps can target and with what authority.
210 Gonzales Letter, supra note 41.
1l1 See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 15 ("President Bush did not ask Congress to in-
clude .. the program as part of the Patriot Act and has not sought any other laws to authorize
the operation. Bush administration lawyers argued that such new laws were unnecessary, be-
cause they believed that the Congressional resolution ... provided ample authorization, offi-
cials said.").
212 Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act, entitled Roving Surveillance Authority Under the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, directs the FISA court, if it finds "that the actions of the
target of the application may have the effect of thwarting the identification of a specified per-
son," to include in its approval order a direction to "such other persons" to "furnish the appli-
cant forthwith all information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the
electronic surveillance." USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 27, at § 206. These so-called roving
wiretaps have been used in criminal investigations since 1986. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
HOW THE ANTI-TERRORISM BILL LIMITS JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF TELEPHONE AND INTERNET
SURVEILLANCE (2001), http://www.aclu.org/natsec/emergpowers/12484leg20011023.html.
They are directed at targets who may be attempting to conceal their identities by switching
phones, and are meant to provide authority to "wiretap" a person rather than a specific phone
line. Id.; see also Michael Goldsmith, Eavesdropping Reform: The Legali of Roving Surveillance,
1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 401, 409-11 (discussing the new developments in both technology and
criminal behavior that allowed roving surveillance to emerge). They may mean "law enforce-
ment agents can listen in on any phone the target might use because he is nearby. When the
target of a roving wiretap order enters another person's home, law enforcement agents can tap
the homeowner's telephone." AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra. In amending FISA by enact-
ing the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress meant to provide this authority, already in place for
criminal investigations, to intelligence investigations as well. Id.
213 A pen register is a list of phone numbers dialed out from a telephone line or, more
broadly, a list of destinations of communications outgoing from a particular site. Jerrold K
Foodick with Jon Lowell & Anthony Marro, How to Get Your Man, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1, 1975, at
113. Section 214 of the USA PATRIOT Act, entitled Pen Register and Trap and Trace Authority
Under FISA, modifies the existing pen-register and tap-and-trace provision of FISA by broaden-
ing the scope of possible targets so long as the target is not a "United States person" and direct-
ing the FISA court, upon its findings pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1805, to grant a request for a pen-
register that treats telephone lines like "other facilities." USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 27, at
§ 214. The USA PATRIOT Act provisions were aimed at making it easier to target Internet
communications. SeeJohn Jerney, Is Big Brother Watching You While You Sur, DAILY YOMIURI
(Tokyo),Jan. 25, 2005, at 18 ("In the context of the Internet, the Patriot Act enables authorities
to use [pen registers] to gather e-mail addresses as well as the IP addresses of communicating
systems. In fact, the U.S. Justice Department has publicly stated that these activities are within
their interpretation of the Patriot Act.").
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clude in the USA PATRIOT Act.114 Had Congress intended to author-
ize broad presidential wiretapping authority with the AUMF, many
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act would have been superfluous.
Rather, Congress authorized those procedures it expressly passed in
the USA PATRIOT Act and did not authorize warrantless surveillance
with the AUMF.
In January 2003, over a year after Congress passed the AUMF and,
the Bush administration contends, with it statutory authorization for
a program of indefinite warrantless wiretapping for foreign intelli-
gence surveillance, which had also been continuing for over a year,
the Department of Justice drafted legislation entitled the Domestic
Security Enhancement Act of 2003 and then abandoned it after it was
leaked to the press.1 5 Section 103 of the draft bill would have
amended the section 1811 emergency provision of FISA, which allows
warrantless wiretapping for the fifteen days following a declaration of
war, to extend the same authorization to the fifteen days following
"the enactment of legislation authorizing the use of military force, or
an attack on the United States. ... ,,26 Had the AUMF truly author-
ized the NSA wiretapping program, this provision would have been
duplicative and meaningless. This also points out an important fea-
ture of the structure of FISA: the section-1811 emergency provision
provides a framework for FISA surveillance after a declaration of war,
suggesting that even such a declaration, much less a force authoriza-
tion, cannot implicitly override FISA, but must instead operate within
its framework.
Since neither the authority for warrantless wiretapping nor the au-
thority to target U.S. citizens or permanent residents were within the
scope of the AUMF, it provides no exception to FISA's rule against
warrantless surveillance. Nor does FISA's own section 1802, which
only applies when foreign powers are targeted and it is substantially
214 See Memorandum from David Kris, supra note 180, at 6-7 ("[G]iven the nearly simultane-
ous Congressional overhaul of FISA, it is hard to read the AUMF as carving out a wide slice of
,electronic surveillance' involving U.S. persons and others located inside the United States.").
215 Dan Eggen, 2003 Draft Legislation Covered Eavesdropping: Justice Dept. Officials Call Measure
Unrelated; Critics Say Bush Claims Are Undermined, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2006, at A02.
216 Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, § 103, 108th Cong. (2003) (draft legisla-
tion), available at http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/patriot2-hi.pdf.
217 Cf Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 20-
21, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-cv-313 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2006). Compare Eg-
gen, supra note 215 ("'These proposals were drafted by junior staffers and never formally pre-
sented to the attorney general or the White House,' said [Justice] [D]epartment spokeswoman
Tasia Scolinos. 'They were not drafted with the NSA program in mind.'"), with id. ("'It's rather
damning to their current view that they didn't need legislation,' said Timothy H. Edgar, a na-
tional security lawyer at the American Civil Liberties Union. 'Clearly the lawyers at the Justice
Department, or some of them, felt that legislation was needed to allow the government to do
what it was doing.'").
218 Constitution Project Memorandum, supra note 152, at 3.
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unlikely that the surveillance will eavesdrop upon American citizens
or permanent residents. The President's authorization and the
NSA's warrantless surveillance are therefore both illegal under FISA
section 1809(a) (1).219
V. THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT HAVE INHERENT ARTICLE II AUTHORITY
FOR WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE THAT OVERRIDES THE
STATUTORY PROHIBITION
After determining that Article II authorizes surveillance but that
warrantless electronic surveillance of people inside the United States
may be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and is illegal
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the inquiry must re-
turn to Article II to determine whether the executive possesses ple-
nary authority for such surveillance that renders statutory limitations
upon it unconstitutional. The Bush administration has argued not
only that Article II grants the President authority to conduct war-
rantless electronic surveillance, but also that this authority is so fun-
damental that it cannot be destroyed by statute.220 Since Congress re-
tains certain powers over the regulation of foreign affairs, Article II
confers no such absolute authority on the President.
The President undoubtedly possesses authority to conduct surveil-
lance in wartime rooted in his or her powers as commander in chief
and as the nation's organ in foreign affairs.2 ' Nevertheless, Congress
too holds important powers over foreign affairs and war. Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution vests the legislative branch with the
powers
[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defence[,] ... [t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations[,] ... [t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturaliza-
tion[,] ... [to] regulate the Value... of foreign Coin[,] ... [t]o define
and punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations[,] [t]o declare War,
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Cap-
tures on Land and Water[,] [t]o raise and support Armies .... [t]o pro-
vide and maintain a Navy[,] [t]o make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces[,] [t]o provide for calling forth
the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and
repel Invasions[,] [t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining,
the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in
the Service of the United States[,] [and to] make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
219 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (2000).
220 The President's Radio Address, supra note 32; accord U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note
165, at 29-36.
221 See supra Part II.
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and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
22
In Johnson v. Eisentrager, the Court noted the breadth of congressional
war powers: "[i]ndeed, out of seventeen specific paragraphs of con-
gressional power, eight of them are devoted in whole or in part to
specification of powers connected with warfare. 
22 3
The Court has long recognized that "Congress has broad power
under the Necessary and Pro er Clause to enact legislation for the
regulation of foreign affairs."2V In 1915, Justice Joseph McKenna rea-
soned that, because "the United States is invested with all the attrib-
utes of sovereignty," those powers unenumerated in Article I were es-
pecially broad with respect to international affairs. 2 5 While noting
broad executive foreign affairs powers in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., Justice George Sutherland found that Congress pos-
sessed such powers as "necessary concomitants of nationality" to
delegate. 6 In 1958, Justice Felix Frankfurter issued a most direct
statement of such authority: "[a]lthough there is in the Constitution
no specific grant to Congress of power to enact legislation for the ef-
fective regulation of foreign affairs, there can be no doubt of the exis-
tence of this power in the law-making organ of this nation., 2 27  Re-
cently the Court has held that this legislative power applies all the
more when individual rights, as well as foreign affairs, are impli-
cated. s
There is an interaction between Congress and the President in the
field of foreign affairs during wartime, and presidential authority in
the area does not inherently trump legislative authority. 29 Our sys-
2 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
223 339 U.S. 763, 788 (1950). The Eisentrager Court framed these congressional powers as
parallel to the President's commander-in-chief power and noted that the "grant of war power
includes all that is necessary and proper for carrying these powers into execution," presumably
referring to both congressional and presidential war powers. Id.; see also 147 CONG. REC. S9419
(daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold) ("Congress owns the war power. But by
[the AUMF], Congress loans it to the President in this emergency. In doing so, we demonstrate
our respect and confidence in both our Commander in Chief and our Constitution.").
2 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
26 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
227 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958), overruled by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257
(1967) (rejecting the specific holding that "Congress has any general power, express or implied,
to take away an American citizen's citizenship without his assent").
228 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("Whatever power the
United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or
with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three
branches when the rights of individuals are at stake.").
2'n A Congressional Research Service memorandum locates foreign intelligence collection
between Congress's and the President's constitutional authorities:
Foreign intelligence collection is not among Congress's powers enumerated in Article I
of the Constitution, nor is it expressly mentioned in Article II as a responsibility of the
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tem of government's philosophical forebears sought to locate power,
including the power to regulate military affairs, in separate yet inter-
dependent branches. 2' ° The Framers, eternally concerned with thethreat of building a nation with executive power so similar to Eng-
President. Yet it is difficult to imagine that the Framers intended to reserve foreign intel-
ligence collection to the states or to deny the authority to the federal government alto-
gether. It is more likely that the power to collect intelligence resides somewhere within
the domain of foreign affairs and war powers, both of which areas are inhabited to some
degree by the President together with the Congress.
Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorneys, American
Law Division, for the Congressional Research Service CRS-3 to -4 (Jan. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/mOlO5O6.pdf; see also John Cary Sims, What the NSA Is Do-
ing... and Why It's Illegal, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105, 133 (2006) ("There does not appear to
be any precedent.., where Congress legislated in an area within its legislative authority but it
was nonetheless held by the Supreme Court that the President had inherent authority to act
contrary to the statute."); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221, 1278 (1995)
("[I] nvocation of [a single Article] without regard to the structural relationships among various
constitutional provisions is an inadequate mode of constitutional interpretation"); John C. Yoo,
War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1639, 1662 (2002) ("Placing the Declare War
Clause in its textual context shows that the Constitution does not define a legalistic procedure
for warmaking, but instead creates a flexible system that permits different variations to be cre-
ated through the interaction of the political branches." (emphasis added)). While Yoo agrees that
constitutional war powers are shared between the executive and Congress, he strangely views
Congress's role as limited to its holding of the purse strings. See id. at 1650, 1683 ("[T]he ex-
ecutive should exercise full powers over the beginning and operation of war, subject to the leg-
islature's power over funding."). Senator Feingold refuted this view during the debate upon
the passage of the AUMF:
I also recognize that power-of-the-purse legislation relating to the commitment of U.S.
armed forces is an available remedy, but not an ideal model....
But I worry, nonetheless, about how close we would come to a constitutional crisis if
we were to rely on such measures as a last resort in a war powers struggle with the Presi-
dent. In a way, it illustrates our level of urgency about preserving our constitutional war
power responsibilities, and they risk infringement upon the President's equally valid
constitutional responsibilities as Commander in Chief.
147 CONG. REC. S9419 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold). Article I's many
provisions specifying Congress's war powers contradict Yoo's narrow view.
230 See, e.g.,JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 143-47 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett 1980) (1690) (discussing the legislative, executive, and federative powers and their lo-
cation in different bodies of government); MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. XI ch. 6 1 4
(David Wallace Carrithers ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 1977) (1748) (originally translated in
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (Thomas Nugent trans., Nourse 1750)) ("When the legisla-
tive and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistry, there
can be then no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate
should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner."). These ideas of checks
and balances were echoed in the words ofJames Madison:
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.... If men were angels, no government
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls
on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be adminis-
tered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the gov-
ernment to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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land's monarchy that history would repeat itself, 3 1 noted that the
President's commander-in-chief power would not be unchecked:
The President is to be commander-in-chief.... In this respect his au-
thority would nominally be the same with that of the king of Great Brit-
ain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing
more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval
forces, as first general and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the
British king extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulat-
ing of fleets and armies-all which, by the Constitution under considera-
tion, would appertain to the legislature."'
During the 1787 convention, the Framers debated whether the legis-
lature or the executive was the proper body for the war power, finally
agreeing to divide it:
Mr. [Pierce] BUTLER. The objections ag[ainst vesting the power to
make war] in the Legislature lie in great degree ag[ainst] the Senate. He
was for vesting the power in the President, who will have all the requisite
qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will support it.
Mr. [James] MADISON and Mr. [Elbridge] GERRY moved to insert "de-
clare," striking out "makd' war; leaving to the executive the power to repel
sudden attacks.
Mr. GERRY never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower
the Executive alone to declare 
war.
233
231 See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2-29 (U.S. 1776) (enumerating the
ways in which the King had established "an absolute Tyranny" over the colonies); JAMES
MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 45 (Bicentennial ed.
1987) ("Mr. PINKNEY [sic] was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid [of] render[ing] the Ex-
ecutive a monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an elective one."); id. at 53 ("[T]here is a natural
inclination in mankind to Kingly Government.... I am apprehensive therefore.... that the
Government of these States, may in future times, end in a Monarchy." (statement of Dr. Benja-
min Franklin)); id. at 67 ("Mr. [John] RUTLIDGE [sic] was by no means disposed to grant [the
judicial appointment power] to any single person. The people will think we are leaning too
much towards Monarchy."); id. at 357 ("It was pretty certain [Hugh Williamson] thought that
we should at some time or other have a King; but he wished no precaution to be omitted that
might postpone the event as long as possible.").
2 THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 416 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The
entire paper is concerned with tempering fears that the President would become a new king
and, worse, a tyrant:
The first thing which strikes our attention is that the executive authority, with few excep-
tions, is to be vested in a single magistrate. This will scarcely, however, be considered as
a point upon which any comparison can be grounded; for if, in this particular, there be a
resemblance to the king of Great Britain, there is not less a resemblance to the Grand
Seignior, to the khan of Tartary, to the Man of the Seven Mountains, or to the governor of
New York.
Id. at 414.
233 MADISON, supra note 231, at 476. George Mason saw problems in focusing the war power
in either the executive, "because not safely to be trusted with it," or the Senate, "because not so
constructed as to be entitled to it." Id. He favored dividing the powers and using the word "de-
clare" rather than "make" so that engaging in war would be more difficult. Id.; see also Letter
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When President Thomas Jefferson addressed Congress regarding his
decision to place frigates along the Barbary Coast for defensive pur-
poses, he recognized that his ships were "[u]nauthorized by the Con-
stitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go out beyond the line
of defence," because it was up to Congress, not the executive, to "au-
thoriz [e] measures of offence.",1
34
That the control of the military, as that of so many government
functions, is divided between branches which must agree, cooperate,
and compromise to produce results is as clear today as it was at the
nation's birth.2 35  In June 2006, the Supreme Court handed down
from Gouverner Morris to Lewis R. Morris (Dec. 10, 1803), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 405 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) ("[T]o the Senate was given a consider-
able share of those powers exercised by the old Congress. One important point, however, that
of making war, was divided between the Senate and House of Representatives." (emphasis
added)). See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 290 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("The powers relating to war and peace, armies and fleets, treaties and finance, with the
other more considerable powers, are all vested in the existing Congress by the articles of Confed-
eration. The proposed [Constitution] ... only substitutes a more effectual mode of administer-
ing them." (emphasis added)). James Madison emphasized the importance of the constitu-
tional war powers granted to Congress, notjust those of the President:
Securing against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is
an avowed and essential object of the American Union. The powers requisite for attain-
ing it must be effectually confided to the federal councils.
Is the power of declaring war [Article 1, Section 8, Clause 11 ] necessary? No man
will answer this question in the negative. It would be superfluous, therefore, to enter
into a proof of the affirmative. The existing Confederation establishes this power in the
most ample form.
Is the power of raising armies [Article 1, Section 8, Clause 12] and equipping fleets
necessary? This is involved in the foregoing power. It is involved in the power of self-
defense.
THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 252 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
While the Federalist authors frequently stressed the importance of national defense, see, for
example, id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 149 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("The authorities essential to the common defense.., ought to exist without limitation, because
it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent
extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them."), they also underscored the
need to check the president's authority with that of Congress.
234 President Thomas Jefferson, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 8, 1801) (transcript
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/sou/jeffmesl.htm) (emphasis
added).
235 Jane E. Stromseth agrees that "the framers desired a democratic check on the power of
the President to initiate armed conflict." Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the
President, and the United Nations, 81 GEO. L.J. 597, 597 (1993). She argues that this should be
understood in the realm of current affairs to require a model wherein the President and Con-
gress come to an agreement on the use of forces, at least in actions sanctioned by the United
Nations. Id. at 601-20; see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 773 (1996) ("Separation-of-
powers principles are vindicated, not disserved, by measured cooperation between the two po-
litical branches of the Government, each contributing to a lawful objective through its own
processes."); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) ("Congress has broad
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact legislation for the regulation of foreign
affairs."); The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863) (discuss-
ing the various constitutional roles of Congress and the President vis-h-vis war); Senate Intelligence
Surveillance Hearing, supra note 49 ("I think we can all agree that both of the elected branches
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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a reconciliation of due-process rights with "the
exigencies of war" on the issue of trial of Guantdnamo detainees by
136military commission. Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Guant~inamo de-
tainee, alleged member of al-Qaeda, and personal driver and body-
guard to Osama bin Laden, was charged with conspiracy and slated
for trial by military commission pursuant to President Bush's order
regarding "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism."237 Hamdan attacked the procedures
of the commission, especially its denial of his right to be present to
hear accusations against him, by filing writs of habeas corpus and
mandamus in the Western District of Washington. Ultimately in-
validating the commission because of its violation of laws of war laid
out in the Geneva Conventions, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice John Paul Stevens, ruled that the President had no inherent
authority to circumvent congressional limitations on military commis-
239sions. In describing "the interplay between [congressional and ex-
ecutive war] powers,, 240 the Court quoted Chief Justice Salmon P.
Chase's dissent from Ex Parte Milligan:
The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to exe-
cute in the President. ... [N]either can the President in war more than
in peace, intrude upon the proper authority of Congress, nor Congress
upon the proper authority of the President .... Congress cannot direct
the conduct of campaigns, nor can the President, or any commander
under him, without the sanction of Congress, institute tribunals for the
trial and punishment of offences, either of soldiers or civilians .... 241
have important roles to play during a time of war." (statement of Attorney General Gonzales));
147 CONG. REC. H5632 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001) (statement of Rep. Peter DeFazio) ("[Wle
must be careful not to cede our constitutional duties now or set a precedent for doing so in the
future .... [Mlaintaining this solemn congressional prerogative to send our young men and
women into battle is critical to protecting the delicate balance between the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches." (emphasis added)); id. at H5634 (statement of Rep. Brad Sherman) ("Su-
preme Court opinions ... indicate that it is Congress, rather than the President, that was really
given the obligation to form American foreign policy under the Constitution.... [W]e in Con-
gress need to do more than just provide $40 billion and a blank check and leave town.");
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENCY: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 500 (5th ed. 1984)
(calling the Constitution "an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American for-
eign policy"). When relying on The Federalist as authority for the proposition that the judiciary
should defer to the executive, Justice Thomas's Hamdi dissent nevertheless acknowledged that
"Congress, to be sure, has a substantial and essential role in both foreign affairs and national se-
curity." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 582 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added), enforced, 378 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2004).
26 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773 (2006), superseded on other grounds, Military Commissions Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
257 Id. at 2760-61 (citing Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002)).
28 Id. at 2759, 2761-62.
239 Id. at 2774-75.
240 Id. at 2773.
241 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139-40 (Chase, CJ., dissenting).
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Stevens then observed that congressional approval of military com-
missions, outlined in Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
242tice, included "the express condition that the President and those
under his command comply with the law of war. 2 43 With particular
clarity the Court reaffirmed centuries-old principles regarding the
wartime interplay of legislative and executive powers: "[w] hether or
not the President has independent power, absent congressional au-
thorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard limi-
tations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on
his powers.
244
In a concurrence joined by three Justices in the majority, Justice
Anthony Kennedy drew the same distinction, his words seemingly in-
fluenced by the already-swirling debate regarding the warrantless-
wiretapping program:
This is not a case... where the Executive can assert some unilateral au-
thority to fill a void left by congressional inaction. It is a case where Con-
gress, in the proper exercise of its powers as an independent branch of
government, and as part of a long tradition of legislative involvement in
matters of military justice, has considered the subject of military tribunals
and set limits on the President's authority. Where a statute provides the
conditions for the exercise of governmental power, its requirements are
the result of a deliberative and reflective process engaging both of the
political branches. 45
Both the majority of the Hamdan Court and Justice Kennedy cited
Justice Robert Jackson's oft-quoted concurrence in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co v. Sawyer, the so-called Steel Seizure case, which also recog-
nized this interplay:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot
conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based
on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context. While the
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contem-
plates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdepend-
ence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but
fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of
246Congress.
242 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
243 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
244 Id. at 2774 n.23 (emphasis added); cf id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Congress has
not issued the Executive a 'blank check.' Indeed, Congress has denied the President the legis-
lative authority to create military commissions of the kind at issue here. Nothing prevents the
President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary." (internal ci-
tation omitted)).
245 Id. at 2799 (Kennedy,J., concurring).
246 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (JacksonJ., concurring).
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At the height of the Korean War in 1952, as the result of a dispute
with steel-mill owners over collective bargaining agreements, the
United Steelworkers of America called a strike .2 4  Because of "indis-
pensability of steel as a component of substantially all weapons and
other war materials," President Harry Truman ordered Commerce
Secretary Charles W. Sawyer to take possession of the steel mills to
keep them operating.248  The majority opinion, authored by Justice
Hugo Black, found that it was within the domain of Congress, not the
President, to make legislative decisions concerning wartime policy.
249
Justice Jackson proceeded to lay out a scheme of three situations vis-A.-
vis presidential and congressional authority. 250 Since the administra-
tion maintains that the program was authorized by Congress through
251the AUMF, it estimates that its actions fall within the first of these,
where "the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authori-
zation of Congress" 252 and so is "at the zenith of his powers. 2 3 Only
in such a situation, Justice Jackson maintains, "may [the President] be
said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sover-
eignty. '2 54 As we have seen, however, Congress provided no such au-P • 255
thorization and has in fact criminalized such action. While am-
biguous statutory language may be interpreted within the realm of
plausibility to reconcile constitutional claims, 56 Congress's plain and
explicit language in setting forth the "exclusive means" for electronic
247 Id. at 582-85 (majority opinion).
248 Id.
249 Id. at 587-89.
250 Id. at 636-38 (Jackson,J., concurring).
251 Compare Johnston & Greenhouse, supra note 168 ("President Bush cited the resolu-
tion ... on Monday at his news conference. So did Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, who
in a session with reporters said the Congressional measure... gave the government the power
,to engage in this kind of signals intelligence.'"), with U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 165, at 2
("The AUMF places the President-at the zenith of his powers in authorizing the NSA activi-
ties.").
252 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
23 U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 165, at 2.
Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 636 (Jackson, J., concurring); cf United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("The President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.") (quoting 10 ANNALS OF
CONG. 613 (1800) (statement of Marshall,J.)).
25 See supra Part IV.
See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2005) ("It is not at all unusual to give a statute's
ambiguous language a limiting construction called for by one of the statute's applications, even
though other of the statute's applications, standing alone, would not support the same limita-
tion. The lowest common denominator, as it were, must govern." (emphasis added)); INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001) ("[Iff an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute
would raise serious constitutional problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is
fairly possible,' we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems." (emphasis
added) (citation omitted)); cf U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 165, at 28-36 (arguing that the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance applies to the interpretation of FISA).
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surveillance can only be read as meaning what it says. In this
light, the President has "take In] measures incompatible with the ex-
pressed or implied will of Congress, [and so] his power is at its lowest
ebb, for .,. he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter."2
Recent cases have recognized that the powers of the Executive
may be more significantly checked in situations like the present that
confront individual rights. In interpreting the AUMF in Hamdi, the
Supreme Court noted that, " [w] hatever power the United States Con-
stitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other na-
tions or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assur-
edly envisions a role for all three branches when the rights of
individuals are at stake., 260 Congress has its own inherent authority in
balancing the First and Fourth Amendments against national-security
interests. Since Congress retains constitutional powers to declare
war, make rules regarding enemy capture, and the like, the President
cannot rely on inherent authority to trump the statutory prohibition.
As the Court realized in Hamdan, Congress passed Article 21 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice as both an acknowledgement of
and a limitation on executive powers regarding military commis-
sions.26 1 By passing FISA, Congress recognized constitutionally vested
executive surveillance authority but, in a move even more explicit
than the one at issue in Hamdan, asserted the power to regulate it:
The basis for this legislation is the understanding-concurred in by the
Attorney General-that even if the President has an "inherent" constitu-
tional power to authorize warrantless surveillance for foreign intelligence
purposes, Congress has the power to regulate the exercise of this author-
ity by legislating a reasonable warrant procedure governing foreign intel-
262ligence surveillance.
The Senate Intelligence Committee noted that the purpose of FISA
was "to curb the practice by which the Executive Branch may conduct
257 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(f) (2000 & Supp. 112002).
258 See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 (2001) ("[T]he
canon of constitutional avoidance has no application in the absence of statutory ambiguity.");
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 66 (1997) ("The rule [of constitutional avoidance] does
not apply when a statute is unambiguous or when invoked to engraft an illogical requirement to
its text.").
259 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added); cf H.R. REP. No.
95-1720, at 35 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4064 (discussing the
intent to make FISA the exclusive means for electronic surveillance and citing Justice Jackson's
concurrence).
260 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion).
261 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774-75 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Com-
missions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
262 S. REP. No. 95-604, supra note 134, at 16 (citing Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 634-55 (Jackson,
J., concurring)).
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warrantless electronic surveillance on its own unilateral determina-
tion that national security justifies it. 2 63  The administration cited
cases decided prior to the enactment of FISA and pre-FISA historical
examples of executive wiretapping authorizations as support for its
actions,2 64 but that argument ignored that the explicit intent of Con-
gress in passing FISA was to "moot the debate" over inherent Presi-
dential authority by providing a statutory framework.265  The House's
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that the Act
[did] not recognize, ratify, or deny the existence of any Presidential
power to authorize warrantless surveillances in the United States in the
absence of the legislation.... [N]o matter whether the President has this
power, few have suggested that his power would be exclusive. Rather, as
two Attorneys General have testified, Congress also has power in the foreign
intelligence area.
266
Congress identified FISA as an exercise of its own constitutionally
vested authority to regulate the execution of war powers. Further, as
Marty Lederman has argued, FISA claims authority not only from
congressional action through its passage but also from executive ac-
tion through PresidentJimmy Carter's signature; the statute already is
a reconciliation drawing from both congressional and presidential
267war powers.
In arguing that, FISA notwithstanding, the President possesses un-
checked, plenary authority for warrantless wiretapping, the admini-
stration relied heavily on dicta from what is to date the only case ever
appealed to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.268
In In re Sealed Case No. 02-001 (Sealed Case), the government had ap-
plied for and been granted an order for surveillance of an "agent of a
foreign power" in the FISA court.269 The lower court had nevertheless
imposed restrictions on the surveillance aimed at ensuring that law
263 Id. at 8.
2 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 165 (citing historical examples of war-
rantless wiretapping not authorized by Congress, some of which were upheld in court, but all of
which took place before Congress passed FISA).
2M H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. I, at 24 (1978).
26 Id. (emphasis added). The report continues by observing that,
[g]iven the fact that Congress created the Central Intelligence Agency, delimiting its au-
thorized functions and jurisdiction, and appropriates funds for the entire intelligence
community, there can be little debate as to the fact that Congress has at least concurrent
authority to enable it to legislate with regard to the foreign intelligence activities of de-
partments and agencies of this Government either created or funded by Congress.
Id.
267 Martin S. Lederman, Georgetown University Law Center, Address to the Philadelphia
Lawyer Chapter of the American Constitution Society: Torture, Domestic Surveillance and Ex-
ecutive Aggrandizement (June 7, 2006).
26 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 165, at 8 (citing In re Sealed Case No. 02-001,
310 F.3d 717, 742 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam)).
269 310 F.3d 717, 720 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam).
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enforcement or criminal prosecution, rather than foreign-
intelligence collection, was not the primary purpose of the surveil-
lance. 0 The FISA Court of Review was faced with the question of
whether the "significant purpose" test, introduced into FISA by the
USA PATRIOT Act, 27' was consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
272
,,273Noting that the question before it was "the reverse, the court
commented, "We take for granted that the President does have [in-
herent authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign in-
telligence information] and, assuming that is so, FISA could not en-
croach on the President's constitutional power.,,274
This strained reading bases its analysis on split circuit-court opin-
ions that analyzed the President's Article II power's relationship with
the Fourth Amendment, not with the subsequently passed FISA 75
The administration likewise relies on such cases. 276  As the Second
Circuit noted in United States v. Duggan, the courts that "concluded
that the President had the inherent power to conduct warrantless
electronic surveillance to collect foreign intelligence information"
ruled so prior to the enactment of FISA, and "[a]gainst this back-
ground, Congress passed FISA to settle what it believed to be the un-
resolved question of the applicability of the Fourth Amendment war-
rant requirement to electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
270 Id. at 720-21.
271 USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 27, at § 218.
272 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 738.
273 The court was asked not whether FISA could or did limit presidential power, but whether
"FISA amplifTies] the President's power by providing a mechanism that at least approaches a
classic warrant and which therefore supports the government's contention that FISA searches
are constitutionally reasonable." Id. at 742 (emphasis added).
274 Id.; cf Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) ("[T]he real question is whether the
[statutory provisions] are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to perform
his constitutional duty.... ."). The Morrison holding was based on a finding that the principal-
officers portion of the Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2, did not apply to the ap-
pointment of the independent counsel because the position was that of an inferior officer. Id.
at 670-71. Unlike the Appointments Clause as applied to the facts in Morison, the war-powers
provisions of the Constitution do not specifically address the procedures for or assign the duties
of surveillance between the branches of government; indeed, it would have been anachronistic
for the Constitution to address wiretapping. With the surveillance power situated in a gray area
between and among both Congress and the President, it would be less plausible for a court to
find that Congress "impede [d] the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty" on the
subject. Id. at 691.
275 See supra Part III.
276 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 165, at 8. The paper glosses over the nuanced Third
Circuit decision in Butenko, lumping it in with others that find broader authority. Compare
United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc) (undertaking a Fourth
Amendment analysis and finding an instance of surveillance constitutional because a warrant
was subsequently acquired), with United States v. Tniong Ding Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir.
1980) (finding no warrant requirement in foreign intelligence cases), and Zweibon v. Mitchell,
516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc plurality opinion) (finding no exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement).
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purposes .... In Duggan, alleged members of the Provisional Irish
Republican Army had challenged their convictions for transporting
explosives and firearms on the grounds that wiretap evidence against
them should have been suppressed because FISA was unconstitu-
tional.2 7 The court found that
FISA reflects both Congress's "legislative judgment" that the court orders
and other procedural safeguards laid out in the Act "are necessary to in-
sure that electronic surveillance by the U.S. Government within this
country conforms to the fundamental principles of the fourth amend-
ment," and its attempt to fashion a "secure framework by which the Ex-
ecutive Branch may conduct legitimate electronic surveillance for foreign
intelligence purposes within the context of this Nation's commitment to
privacy and individual rights."27 9
It then proceeded to rule FISA "a constitutionally adequate balancing
of the individual's Fourth Amendment rights aainst the nation's
need to obtain foreign intelligence information.
277 743 F.2d 59, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1984).
278 Id. at 64-65.
279 Id. at 73 (internal citations omitted); cf. United States v. Andonian, 735 F. Supp. 1469,
1474 (C.D. Cal. 1990) ("Congress intended [for FISA] to sew up the perceived loopholes
through which the President had been able to avoid the warrant requirement. The exclusivity
clause makes it impossible for the President to 'opt-out' of the legislative scheme by retreating
to his 'inherent' Executive sovereignty over foreign affairs."), affd 29 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994).
280 Duggan, 743 F.2d at 73; accord United States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2005)
(ruling FISA consistent with the Fourth Amendment rights of a defendant convicted of fraudu-
lently obtaining U.S. citizenship by denying membership in terrorist organizations); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings of the Special April 2002 GrandJury (April 2002 Grand Juy), 347 F.3d 197, 206
(7th Cir. 2003) (ruling that FISA materials were not required to be disclosed to a witness who
refused to testify); United States v.Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 573 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v.
Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790-91
(9th Cir. 1987) (finding FISA consistent with the Fourth Amendment rights of a defendant who
offered to sell defense secrets to agents of the USSR); see also id. at 791-92 (finding that FISA is
adequately constituted under Article III and does not violate separation of powers principles or
Article II); United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 148-49 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding that FISA
passes Fifth and Sixth Amendment requirements despite special evidentiary and in camera, ex
parte rules in the FISA Court). For a complete list of cases in ordinary federal court reviewing
FISA through its first ten years, see Cinquegrana, supra note 146, at 817 n.126. None of those
cases found FISA unconstitutional. Robert A. Dawson, Shifting the Balance: The D.C. Circuit and
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1380, 1396 n.100 (1993).
Indeed, all twelve circuit courts (the Federal Circuit excepted) have reviewed FISA without find-
ing it unconstitutional. See, e.g., Damrah, 412 F.3d 618 (Sixth Circuit); April 2002 Grand Jury, 347
F.3d 197 (Seventh Circuit); United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Barr, 963 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1992); Johnson, 952 F.2d 565 (First Circuit); United States v. Mesa-
Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1990); Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (Fourth Circuit); United States v.
Badia, 827 F.2d 1458 (11th Cir. 1987); Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787 (Ninth Circuit); Duggan, 743
F.2d 59 (Second Circuit); Belield, 692 F.2d 141 (D.C. Circuit). Though the Supreme Court has
never directly reviewed the constitutionality of FISA, the Court mentioned it as a positive exam-
ple of Congress "balanc[ing] individual rights and government secrecy needs" in Ponte v. Rea4
471 U.S. 491,515 (1985).
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What the Second Circuit recognized is what the Sealed Case court
in its dicta failed to see: FISA represents the constitutional reconcil-
ing of presidential authority with both congressional authority and
individual rights. 1 The President's authority, important though it is,
does not permit a disregard of both Congress's foreign-affairs and
war-making powers and the Fourth Amendment rights of the people
on either end of wiretapped communications. If the President's
power is not "exclusive" "in the absence of legislation,, 282 it is certainly
not exclusive when it directly contradicts existing legislation. When the
President attempts to "disregard limitations that Congress has, in
proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers 28 3 and
circumvent the framework established in FISA, his power is at "its
lowest ebb." Whatever little doubt about this existed before Hamdan
should certainly have disappeared with the Court's ruling.
CONCLUSION: WHERE THE ABSENCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S
WARRANTLESS-WIRETAPPING PROGRAM WOULD LEAVE THE BALANCE OF
NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
President Bush has maintained that his program is essential in
combating terrorism and preventing future attacks. 84 In light of the
foregoing, one must conclude that the NSA warrantless wiretapping
program is at the very least in criminal violation of FISA and possibly
counter to the Fourth Amendment. This permits two feasible courses
of action: abandoning the program in favor of a legal and constitu-
tional alternative, or tweaking the program to ensure its constitu-
tional validity and amending the law to ensure its legality. Either of
these is a viable option and preferable to abstaining from wiretapping
altogether.285
281 The "persuasive authority" of Sealed Case might also be "undercut[]" by its reliance on pre-
FISA cases, which, unlike those after FISA, were decided under the "twilight area" Steel Seizure
regime because Congress had not yet ruled one way or another on the matter. Bazan & Elsea,
suP-a note 229, at CRS-31 to -32.
28 H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. I, at 24 (1978).
283 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006), superseded on other grounds, Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
84 Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Again Defends Wiretapping Program: Departing from Usual Practice,
President Fields Questions at Town-Hall-Style Event, WASH. POST,Jan. 12, 2006, at A07; see also Walter
Pincus, Spying Necessary, Democrats Say: But Harman, Daschle Question President's Legal Reach,
WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2006, at A03 (noting that, even among those who oppose the administra-
tion, most agree that surveillance is necessary in fighting terrorism).
28!' Even the most outspoken of the President's political critics agree that surveillance is nec-
essary:
We all agree that we should be wiretapping al Qaeda terrorists-of course we should.
Congress has given the President authority to monitor these messages legally, with
checks to guard against abuses when Americans' conversations and email are being
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If the President abandoned the current program, it would not
mean that the federal government would have no way to eavesdrop
on the communications of terrorists coming into and going out of
the United States. Rather, a special court was constructed under
FISA for explicitly that purpose. Section 1804 of FISA outlines the
requirements for a federal officer, under the approval of the attorney
general as authorized by the President, to submit applications for
electronic surveillance." Section 1803 sets up the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court "to hear applications for and grant orders
approving electronic surveillance" and the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Court of Review to review the denial of applications.287 The
FISA court grants an order approving surveillance if it finds that (1)
the attorney general has the authority to approve applications; (2)
the application was appropriately submitted;
(3) on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant there is probable
cause to believe that-
(A) the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or
agent of a foreign power: Provided, That no United States person may be
considered a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon
the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States; and
(B) each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance
is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power; [and]
(4) the proposed minimization procedures meet the definition of mini-
mization procedures under section [1804(h) ] . 28
Such an order constitutes a "warrant" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment;28 9 FISA court rules refer to the order as a "war-
monitored. But instead, the President has chosen to do it illegally, without those safe-
guards.
Senate Judiciary Surveillance Hearing, supra note 49 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking
Member, S. Judiciary Comm.).
286 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), amended by USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 108(a) (1), 120 Stat. 192, 203 (2006).
287 Id. § 1803 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), amended by USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reau-
thorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ 106(f)(1), 109(d), 120 Stat. 192, 197-98, 205
(2006).
288 Id. § 1805 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), amended by USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reau-
thorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ 105(a), 108(a)(2), (b), 120 Stat. 192, 195, 203-
04 (2006). The standard in § 1805(a) (3) is considered lower than the general probable-cause
standard for criminal proceedings. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 15. There is an additional
requirement in § 1805(a) (5) reiterating that the requirements of the application under § 1804
must be met. For a more in-depth discussion of the procedures for securing a FISA warrant, see
Louis A. Chiarella, "So Judge, How Do I Get That HSA Warrant?".- The Policy and Procedure for Con-
ducting Electronic Surveillance, 1997 ARMY LAW. 25.
289 United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1987).
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rant., 291 Under previous administrations, and indeed throughout the
Bush administration, applications were submitted to the FISA court
following this protocol on a regular basis, and the court typically ap-
proved the applications without requiring modification.9 Between
290 See, e.g., RULES OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 10 (discussing the
procedure for "search warrant returns"). Rule 10 "was initiated sua sponte in 1995 [and
amended in 2000] ... to establish a means of notification as to how, in fact, search warrants
previously authorized were carried out." Letter from Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, Presiding Judge,
U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Comm.
on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, et al. (Aug. 20, 2002), available at http://www.cnss.org/
judgeresponse082002.pdf (emphasis added). But cf Letter from Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman,
Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, et al. to Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, PresidingJudge, U.S. For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court (July 31, 2002), available at http://www.cnss.org/
senatorsletter073102.pdf ("Rule 10, added November 2000 [sic], provides for 'search warrant
returns.' The terms 'warrant' and 'return' do not appear in FISA, which instead uses the terms
'court order' and 'report to the court.'").
291 Per 50 U.S.C. § 1807, the Attorney General is required to submit to Congress and the Di-
rector of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts a letter stating the number of
applications submitted, granted, modified, and denied. See, e.g., Letter from William E. Mo-
schella, Assistant Attorney General, to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker, House of Representatives
(Apr. 28, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2005rept.pdf (2005: 2074
applications, 2072 granted, 61 modified, 0 denied (2 were withdrawn, with 1 of these resubmit-
ted and approved); Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, toJ. Dennis
Hastert, Speaker, House of Representatives (Apr. 1, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/agency/doj/fisa/2004rept.pdf (2004: 1758 applications, 1754 granted, 94 modified, 0 de-
nied (3 were withdrawn, with I of these resubmitted and approved)); Letter from William E.
Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, to L. Ralph Mecham, Director, Administrative Office of
the United States Courts (Apr. 30, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/
doj/fisa/2003rept.pdf (2003: 1727 applications, 1724 granted, 79 modified, 4 denied); Letter
from Attorney General John Ashcroft to L. Ralph Mecham, Director, Administrative Office of
the United States Courts (Apr. 29, 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/
fisa/2002rept.html (2002: 1228 applications, 1228 granted, 0 modified, 0 denied (2 applica-
tions had been modified, with those modifications subsequently overturned by the FISA Court
of Review)); Letter from Attorney General John Ashcroft to Dennis Hastert, Speaker, House of
Representatives (Apr. 29, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/
2001rept.html (2001: 932 applications, 934 granted, 2 modified, 0 denied); Letter from Attor-
ney General John Ashcroft to Richard Cheney, President, United States Senate (Apr. 27, 2001),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2000rept.html (2000: 1005 applications,
1012 granted, 0 modified, 0 denied (two applications filed in 2000 were approved in 2001; nine
applications filed in 1999 were approved in 2000)); Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to
Dennis Hastert, Speaker, House of Representatives (Apr. 27, 2000), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1999rept.html (1999: 886 applications, 880 granted,
0 modified, 0 denied (remaining six applications were approved in 2000)); Letter from Attor-
ney General Janet Reno to Dennis Hastert, Speaker, House of Representatives (Apr. 29, 1999),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1998rept.html (1998: 796 applications,
796 granted, 0 modified, 0 denied); Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to Newt Gingrich,
Speaker, House of Representatives (Apr. 29, 1998), available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/agency/doj/fisa/1997rept.html (1997: 749 applications, 748 granted, 0 modified, 0 denied
("In one case,.., the court declined to approve the application as plead for [reasons other
than probable cause], and gave the government leave to amend the application. The govern-
ment has filed a motion to withdraw that case as it has become moot.")); Letter from Attorney
General Janet Reno to Albert Gore, Jr., President, United States Senate (Apr. 18, 1997), avail-
able at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1996rept.html (1996: 839 applications, 839
granted, 0 modified, 0 denied); Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to Albert Gore, Jr.,
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the start of the court in 1979 and the end of 2005, the latest year for
which the Attorney General has submitted records, the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Court has granted 20,814 orders for 20,806 ap-
plications, denying only four and granting leave to modify 238.P92
With the exception of one early modification, all denials and ordered
modifications have come since 2001.9 Without knowing the facts of
President, United States Senate (Apr. 16, 1996), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
agency/doj/fisa/1995rept.html (1995: 697 applications, 697 granted, 0 modified, 0 denied);
Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to Albert Gore, Jr., President, United States Senate
(May 1, 1995), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1994rept.html (1994: 576
applications, 576 granted, 0 modified, 0 denied); Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to
Albert Gore, Jr., President, United States Senate (May 3, 1994), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1993rept.html (1993: 509 applications, 509 granted,
0 modified, 0 denied); Letter from Stuart M. Gerson, Acting Attorney General, to Albert Gore,
Jr., President, United States Senate (Mar. 10, 1993), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
agency/doj/fisa/1992rept.html (1992: 484 applications, 484 granted, 0 modified, 0 denied);
Letter from Attorney General William P. Barr to Dan Quayle, President, United States Senate
(May 29, 1992), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1991rept.html (1991: 593
applications, 593 granted, 0 modified, 0 denied); Letter from Attorney General Dick Thorn-
burgh to Dan Quayle, President, United States Senate (May 10, 1991), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1990rept.html (1990: 595 applications, 595 granted,
0 modified, 0 denied); Letter from Attorney General Dick Thornburgh to Dan Quayle, Presi-
dent, United States Senate (Apr. 13, 1990), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/
fisa/1989rept.html (1989: 546 applications, 546 granted, 0 modified, 0 denied); Letter from
Attorney General Dick Thornburgh to Dan Quayle, President, United States Senate (Apr. 12,
1989), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1988rept.html (1988: 534 applica-
tions, 534 granted, 0 modified, 0 denied); Letter from Attorney General Edwin Meese III to
George Bush, President, United States Senate (Mar. 30, 1988), available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/agency/doj/fisa/1987rept.html (1987: 512 applications, 512 granted, 0 modified, 0 de-
nied); Letter from Attorney General Edwin Meese III to George Bush, President, United States
Senate (Mar. 24, 1987), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1986rept.html
(1986: 573 applications, 573 granted, 0 modified, 0 denied); Letter from Attorney General
Edwin Meese III to George Bush, President, United States Senate (Mar. 5, 1986); available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1985rept.html (1985: 587 applications, 587 granted,
0 modified, 0 denied); Letter from Attorney General Edwin Meese III to George Bush, Presi-
dent, United States Senate (Mar. 6, 1985), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/
fisa/1984rept.html (1984: 635 applications, 635 granted, 0 modified, 0 denied); Letter from
Attorney General William French Smith to George Bush, President, United States Senate (Mar.
6, 1984), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1983rept.html (1983: 549 appli-
cations, 549 granted, 0 modified, 0 denied); Letter from Edward C. Schmults, Acting Attorney
General, to George Bush, President, United States Senate (Apr. 4, 1983), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1982rept.html (1982: 473 applications, 475 granted,
0 modified, 0 denied); Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to William E. Foley,
Director, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Apr. 15, 1982), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1981rept.html (1981: 431 applications, 433 granted,
0 modified, 0 denied); Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to the Director of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Apr. 22, 1981), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1980rept.html (1980: 319 applications, 322 granted,
1 modified, 0 denied); Letter from Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti to the Vice President
(undated), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1979rept.html (1979: 199 ap-
plications, 207 granted, 0 modified, 0 denied) [hereinafter collectively FISA Court Letters].
292 FISA Court Letters, supra note 291.
293 Id.
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these necessarily secret proceedings, it is hard to say whether the rar-
ity of denials is a mark of good policy or bad oversight.2 94 Whatever
the reason, one can safely conclude that having an application ap-
295proved is relatively easy.
This ease has prompted some to question why President Bush saw
the need to circumvent the process in the first place: 'Jeffrey H.
Smith, former general counsel to the CIA, said the FISA process
'should have permitted, or enabled, the president to conduct this
surveillance.' Smith said the court sometimes was slow to act in the
past but became 'much more responsive' after the Sept. 11 attacks.,
296
William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General for Congressional
Affairs, said the program was necessary because FISA "could not have
provided the speed and agility for the early warning system" that was
needed.297 Though an anonymous counterterrorism official told the
Los Angeles Times that approval of FISA warrants can take between
twenty-four and forty-eight hours, section 1805(f) allows for an
emergency protocol wherein the Attorney General, after reasonably
determining that there is an urgent or time-sensitive need for the
kind of surveillance contemplated by FISA, can authorize surveillance
up to seventy-two hours in advance of an application to the court.299 It
is implausible that, in an emergency situation, an NSA official could
294 Americo R. Cinquegrana notes the dual interpretations of the high application success
rate:
Proponents of FISA argue that the lack of a denial demonstrates the careful considera-
tion and judgment exercised by the executive branch in reviewing and preparing appli-
cations for submission to the FISC, and that only cases that satisfactorily meet the statu-
tory standards are brought before the Court. Opponents argue that the secrecy that
surrounds the FISC prevents a determination of whether these figures indicate instead
that the FISC has become a captive of the national security establishment and serves only
to encourage executive officials, now protected by judicial approval, to conduct activities
that would otherwise never have been proposed.
Cinquegrana, supra note 146, at 815 (internal citations omitted); see alsoJeremy D. Mayer, 9-11
and the Secret HSA Court: From Watchdog to Lapdog?, 34 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L L. 249, 249 (2002)
("In many ways, the judiciary has become little more than a rubberstamp to the executive's
trashing of the Fourth Amendment in the name of national security.").
295 See Solove, supra note 15, at 1289 ("FISA is very permissive; it provides for expansive sur-
veillance powers with little judicial supervision."). The FISA procedures keep wiretap orders so
secret that they might pose problems themselves. See, e.g., Banks & Bowman, supra note 98, at
87 ("The secrecy that attends FISC proceedings, and the limitations imposed on judicial review
of FISA surveillance, may insulate unconstitutional surveillance from any effective sanction.").
The innovation of President Bush's warrandess-wiretapping approach is in its attempt to keep
its affairs secret from a secret court.
296 David G. Savage & Bob Drogin, Legality of Wiretaps Remains in Question, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18,
2005, at Al.
297 David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Defending Spy Program, Administration Cites Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at A20.
29 Savage & Drogin, supra note 296.
2" 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), amended by USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ 105(a), 108(a)(2), (b), 120 Stat. 192, 195,
203-04 (2006).
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make a determination weighing the necessity of the surveillance in
the interests of national security against the threat to civil liberties of
those eavesdropped upon"°° significantly faster than the Attorney
General could in following the section 1805(f) protocol. Seventy-two
hours is an appropriate amount of time for such application; indeed,
the window was expanded to seventy-two hours from twenty-four to
address flexibility concerns-a move adopted two months after the
301President first authorized the warrantless-surveillance program.
Most of the surveillance conducted in the warrantless-wiretapping
program probably could have received authorization from the nor-
mally approving FISA court, and all of it would have received authori-
zation had it met such basic requirements as section 1805 probable
cause.30 2 What is clear, by inference, is that the only information the
w0 The administration has asserted that the program was "limited" in scope and took civil
liberties concerns into account. See, e.g., Gerstenzang, supra note 43 ("'I'm mindful of your civil
liberties, and so I had all kinds of lawyers review the process,' Bush told the Kansas gathering.").
301 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (as amended by Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-108, 115 Stat. 1394 (2002) (enacted Dec. 28, 2001)), amended 6y USA PATRIOT Im-
provement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ 105(a), 108(a)(2), (b),
120 Star. 192, 195, 203-04 (2006).
302 Cf Constitution Project Memorandum, supra note 152, at 33-34 ("FISA merely requires that
the executive seek and receive a judicial warrant upon probable cause to believe that the com-
munication is by an agent of a foreign power-a determination that the Administration has
stated it can and does make under the warrantless NSA program."). The administration con-
tends that all eavesdropping under the program would be approved by the FISA court:
[The] statement that "[wie cannot monitor anyone today whom we could not have
monitored [September 10, 2001]" [is] accurate with respect to the President's Terrorist
Surveillance Program, because the Program involves the interception of communications
only when there is probable cause ('reasonable grounds to believe') that at least one
party to the communication is an agent of a foreign power (al Qaeda or an affiliated ter-
rorist organization).
Gonzales Letter, supra note 41. Attorney General Gonzales elaborated that this is his interpreta-
tion of the language the President used:
I think it's [a] probable cause [standard]. But it's not probable cause as to guilt [or]
probable cause as to a crime being committed. It's probable cause that a party to the
communication is a member or agent of AL Qaida. The precise language that I'd like to
refer to is, "There are reasonable grounds to believe that a party to communication is a
member or agent or [sic] AL Qaida or of an affiliated terrorist organization." It is a
probable cause standard, in my judgment.
Senate Judiciary Surveillance Hearing, supra note 49 (statement of Attorney General Gonzales).
Other top officials have interpreted this to be a significant change in standard, however:
QUESTION: .... Just to clarify sort of what's been said, from what I've heard you say
today and an earlier press conference, the change from going around the FISA
law.., was to lower the standard from what they call for, which is basically probable
cause to a reasonable basis; and then to take it away from a federal court judge, the FISA
court judge, and hand it over to a shift supervisor at NSA.... [S]ince you lowered the
standard, doesn't that decrease the protections of the U.S. citizens?
GEN. HAYDEN: .... I think you've accurately described the criteria under which this
operates ....
General Michael V. Hayden, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence and former Di-
rector of the National Security Agency, Address to the National Press Club: What American
Intelligence & Especially the NSA Have Been Doing to Defend the Nation (Jan. 23, 2006) (tran-
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NSA program yielded that would not have been gathered in following
the normal FISA channels is that which was collected from surveil-
lance without sufficient specificity, probable cause, or minimization
to meet section 1805 standards. Whether it is in the interests of pub-
lic policy in maintaining a free and secure society to conduct such
surveillance remains to be answered.
If the authorities empowered to make this decision come to the
conclusion that it is in the interests of public policy to permit intelli-
gence agencies to eavesdrop on communications beyond the scope of
FISA, the remaining option is for the Executive to ask Congress to
change both the NSA program and the applicable law to comply with
that policy 30 3 There are several courses of action the government
could take to alter the program to fit the Constitution and the law to
fit the program.
Congress could, if it so desired, pass a resolution directly authoriz-
ing the President to conduct warrantless surveillance for foreign-
intelligence purposes, assuming such surveillance would not run
afoul of the Fourth Amendment. 30 4 An explicit authorization would
be direct enough to override its past measures to contain the exercise
of such power, such as FISA.s05 The authorization could be designed
to meet the requirements of FISA section 1809. o6 The Bush admini-
script available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1564046/posts); see also id. ("The
trigger is quicker and a bit softer than it is for a FISA warrant.... .").
s03 Cf Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Where, as here,
no emergency prevents [executive] consultation with Congress, judicial insistence upon that
consultation does not weaken our Nation's ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that
insistence strengthens the Nation's ability to determine-through democratic means-how best
to do so."), superseded on other grounds, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366,
120 Stat. 2600. For discussions of possible legislative solutions to the controversy over war-
randess surveillance, see Adam Burton, Fixing FISA for Long War: Regulating Warrantless Surveil-
lance in the Age of Terrorism, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 381, 398-404 (2006) (proposing the creation of an
agency to handle ex post review of warrantless surveillance); Katherine Wong, Recent Devel-
opment, The NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program, 43 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 517, 530-34 (2006) (advo-
cating a streamlined warrant process and a "more flexible probable-cause requirement").
so4 For an argument in favor of warrantless surveillance limited only by a traditional reason-
ableness standard, see Nola K. Breglio, Note, Leaving EISA Behind: The Need to Return to War-
rantless Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 113 YALE L.J. 179, 208-15 (2003). But see Robert M.
Bloom & William J. Dunn, The Constitutional Infirmity of Warrantless NSA Surveillance: The Abuse of
Presidential Power and the Injury to the Fourth Amendment, 105 B.C. L. SCH. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER
SERIES 56-68 (2006) (arguing that the NSA program could not be justified under reasonable-
ness "special needs" requirements).
305 Cf Professors' Letter, supra note 165 ("As the Supreme Court recently noted, '"Con-
gress ... does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancil-
lary provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes."'" (quoting Gonzales
v. Oregon, No. 04-623, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 767, at *921 (Jan. 17, 2006) (quoting Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)))).
306 See 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1) (2000) ("A person is guilty of an offense if he intention-
ally... engages in electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute ..
(emphasis added)).
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stration reached out to Congress in an attempt to win this sort of ap-
proval for its program post hoc.07
Congress might also amend the warrantless-surveillance provision
of FS 1 °08 to take into account a broader definition of "foreign
power. ' '3°9 William C. Banks and M.E. Bowman argue that the recent
emergence of al-Qaeda demands a reconsideration of that definition:
Indeed, as terrorists such as [Ramzi] Yousef and Usama bin Ladin illus-
trate, a primary threat from terrorism today appears to have evolved from
large, highly-organized state sponsored terrorist groups to loosely organ-
ized but technically competent persons affiliated through common goals,
not national origin. This new phenomenon, which the FBI has labeled
International Radical Terrorism ("IRT"), includes any extremist move-
ment or group, international in nature, that conducts acts of crime or
terrorism under the banner of personal beliefs in furtherance of politi-
cal, social, economic, or other objectives. Because of the influence they
wield, and their ability to act globally, IRT groups now exercise the type
of destructive power historically held solely by nations and large, hierar-
chically structured organizations. 10
307 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & David. E. Sanger, Facing Pressure, White House Seeks Approval for
Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at A9 ("After two months of insisting that President Bush did
not need court approval to authorize the wiretapping of calls between the United States and
suspected terrorists abroad, the administration is trying to resist pressure for judicial review
while pushing for retroactive Congressional approval of the program."). The Washington Post
reported that political pressure forced the White House to deal with Congress:
[T]he administration was spared the outcome it most feared, and it won praise in some
circles for showing more openness to congressional oversight.
But the actions have angered some lawmakers who think the administration's pur-
ported concessions mean little. Some Republicans said that the White House came
closer to suffering a big setback than is widely known, and that President Bush must be
more forthcoming about the eavesdropping program to retain Congress's good will.
Babington, supra note 174.
508 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); see supra Part IV.A. (discussing how the
current incarnation of section 1802 falls short of authorizing the program). But cf. Gonzales
Letter, supra note 41 ("The Administration believes that it is unnecessary to amend FISA to ac-
commodate the Terrorist Surveillance Program.").
For the purposes of the warrantless surveillance provision, only three of the six previously
listed definitions of "foreign power" apply:
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof whether or not recognized by the
United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United States
persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be
directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments ....
Id. § 1801 (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
310 Banks & Bowman supra note 98, at 104 (internal citations omitted); see also 147 CONG.
REC. S9417 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. McCain) ("No longer do we perceive
the only great threat to our security in the hostile maneuvers of foreign armies; ... no longer
do we sit in splendid isolation, flush with prosperity and naive with peace."); id. at S9418
(statement of Sen. Feingold) ("Our enemy is not a state with clearly defined borders. We must
respond instead to what is quite likely a loose network of terrorists .... We must respond to
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The latter three definitions of "foreign power" listed in FISA but ex-
cluded from the procedure outlined in section 1802 are more appro-
priate categories for these IRT groups. 31' Broadening section 1802 to
include them would authorize something very similar to the program
312already in place.
Like Banks and Bowman, Seth Kreimer advocates a new look at
the intelligence-gathering system in light of 9/11. 313 System changes,
in Kreimer's view, should move toward constraints such as legal
transparency, limited access to sensitive information, and oversight.
314
Peter P. Swire would similarly like to see more oversight and a more
adversarial "devil's advocate" system in both the FISA court and the
FISA Court of Review.' In the months following the public's discov-
ery of the NSA activities, many members of Congress seemed to push
for more oversight, demanding hearings and inquiries to evaluate the316
program. The abuses of the 1970s prompted one such reevaluation
and settlement, and in this new historical context we must "find a set
of structures and commitments that will achieve a new settlement that
preserves American liberty.
3 1 7
Months after the program was made public, senators and repre-
sentatives from both parties introduced bills that would take diver-
gent paths in lending a legislative voice to the debate. As part of
broad legislation called the Real Security Act, Senators Harry Reid
a... diffuse enemy that operates largely beyond the reach of our conventional war-fighting
techniques.").
11 The targets of the program might be "(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or
activities in preparation therefor; (5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially
composed of United States persons; or (6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign
government or governments...." 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000 & Supp. I 2001), amended by USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 506(a)(5),
120 Stat. 192, 248 (2006).
312 Senator Specter's bill would allow the executive branch to devise new surveillance pro-
grams so long as they were approved by the FISA Court and sought "to obtain foreign intelli-
gence information or to protect against international terrorism." National Security Surveillance
Act, S. 3876, 109th Cong. § 4 (2006)).
313 Seth F. Kreimer, Watching the Watchers: Surveillance, Transparency, and Political Freedom in the
War on Terror, 7 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 133 (2004).
314 Id. at 169-81.
315 Swire, supra note 209, at 1365.
316 See generally Eric Lichtblau and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Accord in House to Hold Inquiry on Sur-
veillance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at Al (noting that some Republican camps want an inquiry
into the propriety of the program, while others want to focus exclusively on new policy propos-
als); Maura Reynolds, Congress Weighs Options for Domestic Spy Program: Some Lawmakers Seek to
Make the Surveillance Legal While Others Press for an Inquiry, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, at A20 (dis-
cussing different proposals for congressional oversight); Maura Reynolds & Greg Miller, U.S.
Lawmakers Signal Plans to Monitor Spying: The Type of Oversight Is Unclear as Moderate Republicans
and Bush Loyalists Approach Reviews and Potential Legislation Differently, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2006,
at A21 (outlining the players and positions in the congressional debate over the wiretapping
program).
317 Kreimer, supra note 313, at 181.
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and Dick Durbin included a provision announcing the "sense of
Congress" that the FISA warrant requirement "should remain in
place to protect the privacy of law abiding Americans with no ties to
terrorism" and that "the President is not above the law and must
abide by congressionally-enacted procedures for engaging in elec-
tronic surveillance. 318
Senator Specter backed the National Security Surveillance Act,
which would override portions of FISA by giving jurisdiction to the
FISA Court to approve or deny applications for entire surveillance
programs rather than individual warrants. Key provisions of FISA
would no longer apply to the warrantless-surveillance program or
similar future programs, which would instead be approved based on
findings that they were constitutional, in accordance with certain
minimization procedures, and "reasonably designed" to intercept
communications of a "foreign power ... engaged in... terrorism,"
an agent thereof, or a person communicating with such a foreign
power or agent.3 2 The bill would further yield authority to the Presi-
dent by acknowledging his "constitutional authority... to collect in-
telligence" and adding constitutional authorization as an alternative
to statutory authorization throughout FISA .3
Senator Specter cosponsored a competing bill introduced by
Senator Dianne Feinstein that would reiterate the exclusive nature of
322 323FISA22 while bolstering and expanding its emergency provisions.
Senator Mike DeWine's Terrorist Surveillance Act would grant the
President broad power to authorize warrantless-surveillance programs
for forty-five days based on his own determinations24 and renew them
every forty-five days, 32 1 subject to congressional oversight.3 2 1 It would
also criminally penalize program whistleblowers with fines up to one
million dollars and maximum fifteen-year prison sentences.
The House passed Representative Heather Wilson's Electronic
Surveillance Modernization Act. 2" The bill sought to amend FISA to
318 Real Security Act of 2006, S. 3875, 109th Cong. § 2315(b) (2006).
319 National Security Surveillance Act of 2006, S. 3876, 109th Cong. § 4 (2006).
320 Id. § 6.
321 Id.
522 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Improvement and Enhancement Act of 2006, S. 3877,
109th Cong. § 101 (2006).
323 See id. § 201 (extending the section 1805 emergency provision from seventy-two hours to
one week); id. § 203 (granting additional authority for surveillance ahead of post-hoc warrants);
id. § 208 (adding force authorizations and national emergencies to the list of circumstances
triggering fifteen-day warrantless surveillance).
324 Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006, S. 3874, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006).
325 Id. § 4.
26 Id. § 6.
327 Id. § 8.
328 H.R. 5825, 109th Cong. (2006).
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provide for ninety-day periods of emergency suveillance following
terrorist attacks2 9 or whenever the President determines that the
country is in danger of an imminent threat and presents that deter-
mination to Congress and the FISA Court.3 3 0 It also allowed for sur-
veillance of United States persons for up to sixty days or longer if the
President certifed the reasons for the necessity of the surveillance to
the congressional intelligence committees."' The Senate could not
reach a compromise between its various bills and the House bill be-
fore it adjourned for the 2006 election, leaving the problem of war-
rantless surveillance to a future Congress.3 2
The administration has argued that whoever leaked the details of
the secret program to the public jeopardized national security. 333 The
32 Id. § 13.
330 Id. § 14.
331 Id. §§ 13(e), 14(e).
332 Editorial, A Do-Little Congress, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 3, 2006, at C14.
333 See, e.g., Senate Judiciaiy Surveillance Hearing, supra note 49 (statement of Attorney General
Alberto R. Gonzales) ("All United States laws and policies governing the protection and non-
disclosure of national security information, including the information relating to the activities
described by the President, remain in full force and effect. The unauthorized disclosure of
classified information violates federal criminal law."); Greg Miller, Lawmakers Question Effective-
ness of Spy Program: Leading Republicans Say Al Qaeda Suspects Probably Have Altered Their Methods of
Communication in Light of the Controversy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2006, at A13 ("Rep. Peter Hoekstra
(R-Mich.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee[, said, ..... Does anyone really be-
lieve that after 50 days of having this program on the front page of our newspapers... that Al
Qaeda has not changed the way that it communicates?'"); Scott Shane, Criminal Inquiry Opens
into Leak in Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 31, 2005, at Al ("[Vice President Dick] Cheney said:
'Eventually [the New York Times] ran [the eavesdropping story]. I think that's unfortunate. I
think it damages national security.'"). But cf Scott Shane, Bipartisan Support Emerges For Federal
Whistle-Blowers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at A17 ("Representative Christopher Shays ... is lead-
ing the defense of whistle-blowers who have spoken out about.., illicit federal wiretapping and
other matters. 'It's absolutely essential that we have a system that allows people to speak out
about abuses, especially in the national security realm,' Mr. Shays said in an interview."). An-
swering a reporter's question, President Bush gave an example of the kind of effect on enemy
behavior he feared the leak might cause:
Let me give you an example about my concerns about letting the enemy know what may
or may not be happening. In the late 1990s, our Government was following Usama bin
Laden because he was using a certain type of telephone. And then the fact that we were
following Usama bin Laden because he was using a certain type of telephone made it
into the press as the result of a leak. And guess what happened? Saddam-Usama bin
Laden changed his behavior. He began to change how he communicated.
The President's News Conference, supra note 48. Unlike the case in the President's example,
however, this leak concerned not the details of a target or manner of surveillance, but the exis-
tence of a program of surveillance that differed in legal authorization, but presumably not tar-
get or manner, from surveillance under FISA. Given the publicly acknowledged framework al-
ready in place for eavesdropping on telephone and e-mail conversations in the United States
and abroad, at first blush it seems implausible that the leak about the warrantless wiretapping
program would give terrorists any valuable information or cause them to alter their behavior in
any way. The only seemingly salient differences between surveillance in the NSA program and
that under FISA were the agency conducting it (usually the FBI under FISA) and the presence
or lack of a secret court order. Cf Steve Chapman, Op-Ed., The Administration Investigates: Scru-
tinizing the Wrong People, CHI. TRIB.,Jan. 5, 2006, at C23 ("[A]n opposing coach doesn't have to
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silver lining of the leak is that it will give the President, Congress, the
judiciary, and the voters a new framework in which to openly debate
the balancing of national security and civil liberties and find a solu-
tion that will make the United States stronger.
steal the Indianapolis playbook to find out that Peyton Manning sometimes throws the
ball.. . . 'No terrorist with half a brain thinks his communications are protected by 4th
Amendment strictures against unlawful search and seizure.'" (internal citations omitted)). De-
pending on one's inclination, one can chalk up the claim that the leak is a serious blow to na-
tional security to either material facts unknown to the general public that remain classified, or
politics.
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